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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines how political institutions shape incentives for the
transmission of policy-relevant private information. The first two chapters present
theoretical frameworks to examine strategic information transmission to political
candidates by a biased adviser. The third explores the causal impact of gender
representation on municipal outcomes in the United States.
In Chapter One, I examine a model of “cheap talk” lobbying with no commitment.
A biased adviser seeks to influence the policy outcome of a Downsian election by
sending messages to the two candidates before they announce their policy platforms.
I show that the adviser may credibly reveal some information on voter preferences,
but only privately to one candidate. Political competition has a disciplining effect;
the adviser prefers extreme policies, but instead recommends a pragmatic policy —
one that is just close enough to voters’ preference. In some situations, the presence
of the biased adviser benefits the median voter.
The second chapter presents a model of informational lobbying with full commitment.
The biased adviser strategically designs informative signals on voter preferences that
will be observed by each of the two candidates. In contrast to the cheap talk context,
vii
the optimal signal structure is shown to involve only public signals that are observed 
by both candidates. In particular, candidates receive precise information about how 
extreme voter preferences are, but not whether voters lean right or left. Consequently, 
both candidates choose the same biased policy, as a result of which the median voter is 
always worse off.
Chapter Three investigates the effect of gender representation on municipal 
outcomes in the United States between 2008 and 2016. Using novel data, the analysis 
exploits close elections between male and female candidates to measure the impact of 
an exogenous increase in the number of female council members. Consistent with the 
existing literature, we find evidence of decreased per capita expenditure, which, we 
argue, is not driven by revenue constraints but by increased disagreement or 
“gridlock” within the council. We also find no significant effect of gender 
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Biased Campaign Advice: A Cheap Talk
Model
1.1 Introduction
“I immediately think of interest groups. That’s how we gauge our public
opinion.... I very rarely am clueless about where that constituency is
because of the interest groups keeping me informed...”
— Legislative staffer
Source: (Herbst, 1998)
A substantial literature has been devoted to understanding political influence— 
how biased individuals or entities set about influencing policymakers’ decisions. Such 
entities are sometimes referred to as special interests, and their activities as lobbying. 
Although models are wide-ranging, a large number have focused on strategic 
information transmission as a major form of lobbying.
Such models typically assume the special interest has superior knowledge of the 
optimal policy which the policymaker, as a conscientious social planner, should imple-
ment. This leads to a simple communication game where a biased sender (special inter-
est) communicates with a receiver (policymaker) about an unknown state of the world 
(best policy), and the receiver takes an action that determines payoffs. However, this 
simplification is not without consequences. To the extent that policymakers are not 
social planners but elected politicians, and if some policy decisions must be announced 
before elections, the relevant information is not the best policy, but voter preferences
2
on policy. Furthermore, the policy chosen by a candidate is not implemented unless
they win. In that sense, policy decisions cannot be neatly disentangled from the
election process.
In this chapter, I explicitly study how election incentives shape the role of special
interests in providing — and manipulating — information on voter preferences.1
The model is as follows. Two office-seeking candidates play a Downsian election
game, where each simultaneously chooses a policy platform, which they commit to
implementing if they win. Under majority voting, the policy platform preferred by the
median voter must win. However, candidates are uncertain about voter preferences.
A special interest (henceforth “sender”) possesses this information and is able to send
strategic messages to each candidate before they announce their policy platforms. The
sender is extremely biased; she would like the implemented policy to be as high as
possible. I show that this new model produces strikingly different results regarding
the extent of information transmission and, importantly, the sender’s ability to distort
policy.
Suppose the sender cannot commit to a message strategy — that is cheap talk.
In particular, she cannot promise not to lie, should the occasion arise. This creates
a credibility problem: in the standard cheap talk model, extremely biased senders
always lie, and therefore are never believed. In my model, however, political competition
makes excessive lying disadvantageous. Suppose the sender only talks to one candidate.
Then, if she falsely convinces that candidate to choose an unreasonably high policy,
that policy will lose the election anyway, so it will not be implemented. Hence, the
sender had best recommend a policy platform that is just appealing enough to the
median voter. I show that an extremely biased sender is able to convey information,
and even distort policy, in precisely this manner — giving private advice to one
1There is some evidence that politicians turn to interest groups for information about voter
preferences ((Herbst, 1998)). Indeed, special interests tend to have the resources, incentive and
comparative advantage in knowing how voters feel about particular issues.
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candidate only. This prediction mirrors the kind of partnership that we observe in
real life between politicians and their advisers. Under certain conditions, I show that
even extremely biased advisers may, in fact, improve median voter welfare.
These welfare implications are of immediate and contemporary interest to observers
of American politics. For instance, campaign advisers such as Stephen Bannon are
widely thought to have been successful − at least to some extent − in promoting their
personal policy agenda. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank, provides
advice to a large number of politicians, with the explicit objective to “build and
promote conservative public policies.” More recently, news outlets have reported that
a number of Democratic presidential candidates for the 2020 election are meeting with,
and hiring, strategists from progressive advocacy groups.2 In at least two of these
examples, a large part of the expertise sought by the candidates is in formulating a
policy platform that will appeal to voters. What is less clear is whether such advocacy
ultimately benefits voters, or instead, the particular interests being represented. The
results of this chapter provide some hope by showing that the two are not mutually
exclusive, at least in theory.
1.2 Related Literature
In the benchmark model of cheap talk between one sender and one receiver ((Crawford
and Sobel, 1982)), an important result is that messages convey information if and
only if the sender’s and receiver’s preferences are sufficiently aligned. This carries
forward to models with two or more receivers, as long as the receivers’ actions enter
the sender’s utility independently ((Farrell and Gibbons, 1989)3). This model’s main
departure from previous ones is in introducing political competition, à la Hotelling-
2The New York Times, “2020 Democrats Import Grass-Roots Activism Into Their Campaign
Staffs”, March 2019.
3In (Farrell and Gibbons, 1989), public messages may have a disciplining effect if the total
incentive to tell the truth (summed over both receivers) in each state is positive.
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Downs4, between two receiver-candidates. With political competition, information
may be transmitted even though the sender is completely biased (has state-independent
preferences).
In equilibrium, the sender sends private messages to one candidate only; public
messages are uninformative. In the language of (Farrell and Gibbons, 1989), this is
“subversion”. Whereas in their paper, public messages lead the sender to prioritise
one receiver over the other, here lying to both candidates is actually more tempting
than lying to just one. In equilibrium, the existence of an uninfluenceable candidate
is crucial because it constrains the sender as to what policies could possibly win.
Other papers have dealt with state-independent preferences in different ways. For
example, (Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2007) and (Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2010)
use multidimensional states. The former shows the sender may credibly rank issues
(dimensions), while in the latter, the sender may trade off issues, by partitioning the
state space such that the induced actions leave her indifferent. (Lipnowski and Ravid,
2017) allow the sender to garble information and the receiver to randomise between
actions. All three papers feature one receiver, while my model has two. Furthermore,
in the present chapter, the sender is not always indifferent between messages, because
the true state indirectly affects her payoff. Although she always prefers a high policy
to a low policy, the high policy can only win the election when the state is high
enough, in which case she strictly prefers to recommend it.
To my knowledge, the only other model that combines cheap talk and elections is
(Kartik and Van Weelden, 2019), where the cheap talk is done by candidates to reveal
their ideological biases to the electorate. However, this chapter is also related to a
large section of the political economy literature that tries to explain policy divergence
across parties or candidates. This literature developed as a response to criticisms of
the “median voter theorem” in Hotelling-Downs — a prediction inconsistent with
4(Hotelling, 1929); (Downs, 1957)
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real world observations. See, for example, (Roemer, 1994), (Besley and Coate, 1997),
(Callander, 2005), (Kartik and Mcafee, 2007), (Kamada and Kojima, 2014), to name
only a few. My cheap talk model predicts that, between ex-ante identical candidates,
one may receive better information and diverge from the status quo policy. In
particular, divergence occurs when the information suggests that voters have more
extreme preferences than originally expected.
Last but not least, this chapter and the next contribute to the lobbying literature.
(Grossman et al., 1994) and (Grossman and Helpman, 1996) show how a special
interest can influence policy using campaign contributions. (Grossman and Helpman,
2001) provide an overview of the theoretical literature on lobbying, using pecuniary
or informational means, including a chapter where they discuss cheap talk models in
the context of political influence. Other papers address informational lobbying, for
instance (Potters and van Winden, 1992), which models it as a signalling game, and
(Austen-Smith, 1993), where lobbyists choose whether to acquire information before
lobbying a committee (who sets the agenda) and the House (who vote under closed
rule). This chapter contributes to the literature by studying informational lobbying
at an earlier stage, namely the election process, before candidates even announce their
policy positions.
1.3 Model
To model political competition, I use the Downsian model where two political parties,
or candidates, each commit to a policy platform, which are then subjected to the vote
of the public. The policy platform closest to the median voter’s bliss point must win;
in case of a tie, each wins with 0.5 probability. I assume that candidates do not
know the exact location of the median voter, denoted as θ, but have some common
prior over the policy space. The sender, however, knows θ exactly, and is able to
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send private messages to the candidates before they commit to a policy platform.
Candidates are purely office-motivated, i.e. only care about winning. The sender is
completely biased and wants the winning policy to be as high as possible, irrespective
of θ.
There are three players: the sender, S, and two candidates (receivers), i = 1, 2.
F : Θ → [0, 1] is the common prior over θ. Assume F has full support on
Θ = [0, 1]and continuous density f .
The timeline of the game is as follows:
1. S observes θ. Then S sends a private message mi to each candidate.
2. Candidate i ∈ {1, 2} observes mi and chooses ai ∈ [0, 1]. The candidate
preferred by the median voter wins, and their policy platform is implemented.
In case of a tie, each candidate wins with probability 0.5.
Assume that the median voter has symmetric single-peaked preferences with bliss
point θ.
Define the winner of the election, w, which is a random variable drawn with equal
probability from the set of potential winners, arg maxi∈{1,2}−(ai− θ)2. So w is either
a degenerate random variable at one of the candidates, or takes each value with
probability 0.5.
Now we are ready to define payoffs. As usual in any cheap talk game, we can
define payoffs based solely on the receivers’ actions.
The sender’s payoff is each candidate’s policy weighted by their probability of
winning:
US(a
1, a2; θ) = E(uS(a
w) | a1, a2; θ)
= Pr(w = 1| a1, a2; θ) uS(a1) + Pr(w = 2| a1, a2; θ) uS(a2)
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where uS(.) is a strictly increasing and continuous. In other words, S would like the
winning policy to be as high as possible.
Note that, once we know a1, a2 and θ, each candidate’s probability of winning is
either degenerate or, in the case of a tie, half.
Each candidate’s payoff is proportional to their probability of winning:
Ui(a
1, a2; θ) = Pr(w = i | a1, a2; θ)
A strategy for S is a pair of message mappings σSi : Θ → M , for i = 1, 2. A
strategy for each candidate i defines a policy platform for each message: σi : M →
[0, 1]. Therefore, on the equilibrium path, each receiver chooses a policy equal to
ai = σi(σSi(θ)).
1.4 Equilibria
I consider pure strategy weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (henceforth ”equilibria”) of
this game.
Lemma 0. Babbling is always an equilibrium. There always exists an equilibrium
where both candidates choose a policy platform equal to θ 1
2
, the median of F ,
irrespective of messages. (This is a standard result in cheap talk, and holds true
whether messages are public or private. The interest lies in whether any other
equilibria exist).
Proposition 1. No public messages. If we restrict the sender’s strategy to public
messages (i.e. σS1 = σS2), then the only equilibrium is babbling, and both candidates




Proposition 2. Babble to one, talk to the other. On the equilibrium path, 
at least one candidate’s strategy must be independent of messages, i.e. ∃ U ∈ 
{1, 2} such that σU (σSU (θ)) = aU ∀θ.
Proposition 3. Uninformed candidate competes at lower end. Let U denote 
the candidate whose strategy is independent of messages, and let R denote the other. 
Then aU = inf AR, where AR = {aR : ∃ θ s.t. aR = σR(σSR(θ))}.
Proposition 1 states that, if the sender can only send public messages, there can 
be no meaningful information revelation in equilibrium. Since messages are public, 
both candidates must always update their beliefs in the same manner. Hence, both 
candidates must converge to the median of their common posterior, as in Hotelling-
Downs. Suppose there were an equilibrium with on-the-equilibrium-path messages 
that could induce two distinct posterior beliefs with distinct posterior medians. Then 
since the sender is completely biased, they would never induce the posterior with the 
lower median.5 This intuition is similar to the classic cheap talk model with large 
bias ((Crawford and Sobel, 1982)). In essence, with public messages, it is as if we 
were back to a one-receiver model.
With private messages, however, some information may be transmitted. In particular, 
the sender sends meaningful messages to only one sender. If we compare to (Farrell 
and Gibbons, 1989), this is exactly what they refer to as “subversion”: the sender 
privately reveals information to one receiver but not to the other, and if messages 
have to be public, no information is revealed. Note that the intuition is completely 
different, however. In their paper, the two receivers’ actions enter the sender’s utility 
additively — they do not interact. Here, the strategic interaction between receivers is 
precisely what drives this result. Under public messages, we are back to the Crawford-
Sobel world, where the sender, being too biased, must babble. With private messages,
5The complete proof is slightly more involved. See Appendix II.
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however, the presence of the uninformed candidate (who chooses an unfavourable
policy) is what compels the sender to help the other candidate win.
The uninformed candidate’s policy is now a lower bound on what the sender
can achieve, as the sender would never recommend a lower policy platform to the
other candidate. Any policy that the sender recommends must compete against
the uninformed candidate’s low policy, hence extreme policies can win only if the
median voter prefers them to the low policy. Therefore, political competition provides
endogenous credibility to the sender. If the sender recommends a policy platform that
is too high above the median voter, that policy will lose the election, and the lowest
policy (led by the uninformed candidate) will be implemented instead. The sender’s
best response therefore often involves recommending the highest (most distorted)
policy platform that can still win the election.




In the absence of the sender, both candidates choose the median of F . This is
the median voter theorem, where both candidates are centrists. In the presence of
a biased sender, polarisation occurs, first because one candidate sometimes receives
information which leads him to choose higher policies, and second, because the other
candidate may also diverge from the center of the prior distribution. This is because,
in equilibrium, the uninformed candidate can anticipate what messages the sender
might send to the other candidate. Proposition 4 states that the uninformed candidate
must, in fact, move weakly in the opposite direction, i.e. lower. In other words, the
existence of the sender causes ex-ante identical candidates to diverge from the center,
often in opposite directions. One candidate receives recommendations from the sender
and his policies reflect the sender’s bias, within the constraints of electability. The
other candidate receives no additional information (save his prior) and chooses a
10
policy platform that the sender dislikes.
One potential benefit to voters is the broader choice available to them. Instead
of having to choose between two identical policy platforms, they sometimes have two
different policies to choose from. In particular, the uninformed candidate’s policy
provides an alternative against the high policies chosen by the other. This suggests
that the median voter’s welfare is not necessarily worsened by the presence of the
sender. Indeed, in the next section, I show that in the uniform-prior case, both
sender and median voter benefit from cheap-talk lobbying.
Proposition 5. Finitely many messages. Assume f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (0, 1).
The set of policy platforms for R that are induced in equilibrium, AR = {aR :
∃ θ s.t. aR = σR(σSR(θ))}, is finite.
Proposition 5 states that, the set of messages sent in equilibrium is finite. This
implies that full revelation is impossible, and in fact the extent of information revelation
is quite limited, as in (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). The intuition for the proof is as
follows: As we move along the state space, the sender switches to a higher policy
recommendation as soon as that policy is able to win, even by a tiny margin. If the
set of meaningful messages (or recommendations) is large, it means that the sender
is often inducing very close elections where the median voter is almost indifferent
between the uninformed candidate’s low policy and the other’s high policy. But then,
the uninformed candidate can deviate upwards, slightly closer to the median voter,
and capture all these close elections.
1.5 Uniform Prior
To see what an equilibrium of this game looks like, we must specify a prior distribution
for θ. It is helpful to examine the uniform distribution, which has been extensively
studied in previous models.
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Lemma 1. Two messages. If θ ∼ Uniform[0, 1], then AR is at most a doubleton. 
This means that in equilibrium, the sender recommends one out of a set of at most two 
policy platforms to the informed candidate.
Lemma 2. Interval equilibria.  If θ ∼ Uniform[0, 1], the following is an equilibrium
iff a` ∈ [14 ,
1
3
] and ah = 3a`.
Rename the candidates R,U ∈ {1, 2}, where R 6= U , to denote who receives
information (R) and who receives a babbling message (U). Fix some arbitrary mU ∈









σU(m) = aU = a` for all m ∈M, with prior belief after every m.
σR(m) =

a` for all m ∈M`, with belief θ ∼ Uniform[0, a`+ah2 ],
ah for all m ∈Mh, with belief θ ∼ Uniform[a`+ah2 , 1].
Lemma 3. Sender-optimal equilibrium.  If θ ∼ Uniform[0, 1], then the following 
is an equilibrium, and it achieves the highest equilibrium expected payoff for the 
sender.
Fix some arbitrary mU ∈ M . Also fix a partition {M1, M2} of M , and arbitrary 
elements m1 ∈ M1 and m2 ∈ M2.
σS(θ) =

(mU ,m1) if θ ∈ [0.25, 0.75),
(mU ,m2) otherwise.




0.5 for all m ∈M1, with belief θ ∼ Uniform[0.25, 0.75),
1 for all m ∈M2, with posterior given θ ∈ [0, 0.25) ∪ [0.75, 1].
If uS is linear, this equilibrium gives the sender expected utility Eθ(US(σ
∗; θ)) =
0.625.
Lemma 1 states that, under uniform prior, the informed candidate has at most
two possible policy platforms on the equilibrium path. This means that in any non-
babbling equilibrium, the information that is transmitted to that candidate w.l.o.g.
takes the form of a two-cell partition of Θ. Lemma 2 characterises equilibria where
the cells are intervals of the state space. Such equilibria are quite simple, and
can be completely characterised by the two induced policy platforms, ah and a`.
Proposition 3 immediately implies that the uninformed candidate chooses the lower
policy platform, a`. Furthermore, the cutoff between the two intervals is at the
midpoint of ah and a`. In other words, the sender recommends the higher policy
platform if and only if the median voter will choose it over the lower policy platform.
If θ is below that cutoff, the higher policy cannot win against the lower policy anyway,
so the sender might as well recommend the latter. This is what one might call
pragmatism from the part of the sender: recommending the extreme policy only
when it has a chance of winning.
However, as will be shown by Lemma 3, not all equilibria feature a partition of
the state space into intervals. In particular, in the equilibrium that gives the sender
the highest utility, the two messages convey information about the intensity of voter
preferences: message m1 is sent if θ is moderate, and m2 is sent if θ is extreme. After
receiving the extreme message, the informed candidate is unsure whether voters favour
extremely low or extremely high policies, so he might as well choose a very high policy
(equal to 1), and win half of the time. The uninformed candidate always chooses the
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moderate policy (aU =
1
2
), and so does the informed candidate when he receives the
moderate message.
However, non-interval equilibria turn out to be fragile against small perturbations
of the model. In Appendix I, I examine robustness properties when the sender does
not perfectly observe θ. I find that informational imperfections worsen the sender’s
credibility. As a result, only interval equilibria survive.
It turns out that conveying information about the intensity — but not the direction
— of voter preferences is, in general, a good strategy for the sender (when possible).
This structure of messages will reappear in Chapter Two, when we discuss Bayesian
persuasion. In that setting, the sender has perfect credibility, which allows them to
take this strategy to the extreme. I will show that the optimal strategy for the sender
is to reveal to both candidates exactly the intensity of voter preferences, i.e. how
far θ is from its median. Since candidates receive no information about the direction
(left or right) of θ from the median, they might as well go with the higher policy and
win with probability half.
Lemma 4. Welfare If θ ∼ Uniform[0, 1] and uS is linear, then any non-babbling
equilibrium gives weakly higher utility to the sender and the informed receiver, and
strictly higher utility to the median voter, than the babbling equilibrium.
Lemma 4 states that the median voter’s welfare is improved by the presence of the
sender. The sender distorts policy, but also allows one candidate to tailor his policy
platform according to voter preferences. This effectively creates more choice for the
median voter, compared to babbling where candidates only ever propose one policy
platform. Overall, the median voter is better off.
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1.6 Why Skewness Matters
In general, the prior distribution over the median voter θ could be anything. However,
the shape of that distribution matters for information revelation, because it affects
candidates’ incentive to deviate. Here is a stark example: if the probability density f
is strictly increasing in θ, then babbling is the only equilibrium. To understand why,
one must realise that the sender’s credibility depends crucially on the uninformed
candidate choosing a low policy. The necessity to win the election is what constrains
the sender to recommend a policy platform that is not too far from the median
voter. Hence, the sender and the informed candidate’s incentives align — winning
against the uninformed candidate is their common objective. However, for this to be
an equilibrium, the uninformed candidate must not have an incentive to deviate. In
particular, higher policy platforms must not be too attractive. If the prior distribution
is too negatively skewed, the median voter is likely to prefer high policy platforms,
and the uninformed candidate always prefers to move slightly higher to appeal to the
median voter.
One interpretation is that the sender can only affect policy when their information
carries unexpected “good news”, i.e. when voters are more extreme (favour higher
policies) than was expected under the prior. If voters were ex-ante expected to favour
high policies, both candidates would already be choosing high policies even without
the sender’s messages. In that case, there would be little room for the sender to
further increase policy.
On the other hand, if f is decreasing in θ, high policy platforms are unattractive,
unless the sender provides information to the contrary. The sender is then useful (to
one candidate) in flagging up opportunities to win with a high policy platform. In
such cases, there always exists an equilibrium where messages are informative. The
same turns out to be true if, instead, f is single-peaked and symmetric. The proof
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is constructive, with an equilibrium similar to Lemma 3, where the sender’s message
reveals whether θ is moderate (close to 1
2
) or extreme.
Proposition 6a. Babble if f is strictly increasing. If the prior density f is
strictly increasing in θ, babbling is the only equilibrium.
Proposition 6b. Non-babbling equilibrium if f is weakly decreasing. If the
prior density f is decreasing in θ, a non-babbling equilibrium exists.
Proposition 7. Symmetric single-peaked prior. Suppose the prior f is single-
peaked and symmetric around θ = 1
2
. Then a non-babbling equilibrium exists.
Figure 1.3 shows an example with a decreasing prior density, where the sender
sends three distinct messages in equilibrium. (The faster f decreases, the more
intervals can be revealed in equilibrium).
1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I set up a cheap talk model where an extremely biased sender, who has
private knowledge of voter preferences, sends costless, non-committable messages to
the two candidates in an election. I find that political competition has a disciplining
effect that enables information transmission even by an extremely biased sender.
Furthermore, I show that informative equilibria must satisfy a number of necessary
conditions. Information transmission is sustained by equilibria where one candidate
is uninfluenced by the sender’s messages and always chooses a policy that the sender
dislikes. Thus, the sender has an incentive to help the other candidate win by sending
messages that are informative about voter preferences. This creates an endogenous
alignment of incentives between the sender and one candidate.
However, such equilibria may not always exist. The extent of information transmission
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depends on prior beliefs about the median voter’s preferences. In particular, a strictly
increasing prior density — indicating that the median voter is ex-ante likely to have
policy preferences similar to the sender’s — precludes information transmission in
equilibrium. On the other hand, if the prior density is decreasing, informative
equilibria exist. This may seem counter-intuitive. However, one must remember
that, in any informative equilibrium, the uninformed candidate must be incentivised,
based on his prior, to choose a low policy which the sender does not like. This means
that the prior must assign high probability to low states.
At the exact boundary between the above two cases lies the uniform distribution,
which has been extensively studied in the literature. Consequently, informative
equilibria exist, but only just so. No more than two policy platforms are chosen on the
equilibrium path, which means that the information transmitted is extremely coarse.
A natural interpretation is that the sender makes one of two recommendations (“low
policy”, “high policy”) to one candidate, while the other candidate always chooses
the lower policy. I show that the presence of the biased sender in this setting improves
the median voter’s welfare.
These predictions match real-world observations in three important ways. First,
the model explain why candidates would trust advisers that are known to have
extreme policy motives — a prediction that standard cheap talk models are unable
to deliver. Second, it provides intuition for why advisers (especially biased advisers)
often exclusively serve one candidate: an adviser who influence both candidates via
cheap talk cannot be trusted, as she would lie. Third, this leads naturally to the
conclusion that an adviser that influences one candidate but not the other would
lead to policy differences between candidates, due in particular to the asymmetric
information they receive. In some cases, such as in Section 1.5, this policy divergence
strictly benefits the median voter.
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Finally, a key takeaway from this chapter is that political institutions dramatically
shape the influence of special interests, and biased entities in general, on policy. The
presence of robust, competitive elections allows for information to be extracted even
from extremely biased sources, provided the latter have limited commitment power.
In contrast, standard cheap talk models that ignore electoral incentives more aptly
describe a benevolent dictatorship, with the well-known result that only sufficiently
unbiased sources can reveal any information. Therefore, the institutional context has
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Figure 1·3: Equilibrium with decreasing f .
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Chapter 2
Biased Campaign Advice: An Information
Design Problem
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter studies informational lobbying in a cheap talk context, where the
sender cannot commit to the messages she will send. There, credibility — overcoming
the temptation to lie — is crucial for information revelation. In the real world,
however, a well-established interest group may have considerable commitment power.
The present chapter studies the problem faced by an extremely biased sender who fully
commits ex-ante to the information that she will send to candidates before they make
their policy decision. The existing literature refers to such strategic communication
under full commitment as Bayesian persuasion or information design.1
Commitment power may arise from strong reputational incentives (not modelled
here) or from disclosure obligations, such as in the seminal (Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011) example where a prosecutor can decide what evidence to look for but is legally
bound to reveal the outcome of any investigation. In another interpretation, the
sender commissions an experiment, the design of which is publicly observed, then
decides whether or not to publish the resulting report. (Gentzkow and Kamenica,
2017) show that, in such situations, the report is always published, therefore yielding
predictions that are identical to those of a Bayesian persuasion model.
1Typically, Bayesian persuasion refers to situations with one receiver whereas information design
involves multiple receivers.
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In games with multiple receivers, it is often helpful to imagine the sender as an
“information designer” separate from the game, who is free to manipulate players’
beliefs about a payoff-relevant state of the world before the game begins. The
information designer is restricted solely by a Bayes plausibility condition: each player’s
posterior beliefs must be, on average, equal to the common prior belief on the state.
It is easy to see that information design must allow the sender to achieve weakly
higher utility than under cheap talk, since an equilibrium under cheap talk can also
be replicated by an information designer. Comparing the two frameworks enables us
to understand the value of commitment — how much better off is the sender under
full commitment (information design) as opposed to no commitment (cheap talk).
In this chapter, I study a model similar to that in Chapter One, with the exception
that the sender now has full ex-ante commitment on her message strategy. I show
that commitment power drastically affects the model’s predictions. In particular,
whereas only private communication is possible under cheap talk, the opposite is true
when the sender has full commitment. The sender’s optimal strategy is shown, using
numerical optimisation, to involve only public messages. Furthermore, whereas under
cheap talk only coarse information can be revealed, the sender with commitment is
shown to optimally reveal very precise information. This implies that the sender’s
utility in the information design framework is generically strictly higher than under
cheap talk.
The sender’s optimal strategy involves revealing to both candidates exactly how
extreme voter preferences are, i.e. the quantile distance from the prior median. Hence,
a message pools together exactly two possible realisations of the state of tne world:
one to the left and another to the right of the median state. However, candidates are
unable to distinguish which of these two policies correspond to the median voter’s
true preference, thus there is an equilibrium where they both choose the higher policy
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favoured by the sender. Since both candidates choose the same policy, the latter is
guaranteed to be implemented.
It may at first not be obvious what the sender’s messages would look like in
real-world situations, but they could involve, for instance, the relative chances of
moderate candidates as opposed to extreme ones, but in very precise terms. An
example: “Only 5% of the time is the median voter’s preference this far in the tails”.
A more intuitive, if less precise, statement might be: “The median voter wants a
Bernie Sanders or a Donald Trump, nothing in between.” Statements of a similar vein
often appear as newspaper headlines around election time: “Moderates Can’t Win
the White House” (The Atlantic, February 2020), “Everything in Moderation: Why
a Left-wing Nominee Would Hurt Democrats” (The Economist, November 2019), so
the notion of measuring voters’ divergence from the centre is not an uncommon one.
On the equilibrium path, both candidates choose the same high policy, so the
implemented policy is never lower than the median of the prior distribution. This
is the best possible scenario for the sender, who would like policy to be as high as
possible, but not for a risk averse median voter who prefers policies close to the state of
the world. Indeed, given uncertainty between two values of the state, the best policy
from the median voter’s perspective is a compromise between the two values, not one
of the extremities. It follows that the median voter is strictly worse off under the
sender’s optimal strategy than they would be if the implemented policy was always
equal to the prior median. In other words, the presence of the sender, although she
provides information to candidates, leaves the median voter strictly worse off than
under no information.
The rest of the chapter is as follows. First, I set up the sender’s problem, which
involves the same elements as Chapter One, except that the sender has full ex-ante
commitment on her message strategy. Then, I examine a restricted version of the
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sender’s problem by imposing that only public messages are available to the sender.
Thereafter, I show by numerical optimisation that public messages are indeed optimal
in the unrestricted problem. Lastly, I derive the above welfare result and discuss policy
implications.
2.2 Related Literature
(Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) study situations where a sender designs an experiment,
or equivalently, commits to a state-contingent message strategy, in order to influence
the actions of a receiver. More generally, we can imagine a sender, or information
designer, seeking to influence players’ behaviour in a given game, by sending them
signals about a payoff-relevant state. (Kamenica, 2019) and (Bergemann and Morris,
2019) provide useful surveys of the literature.
Papers featuring multiple receivers include (Heese and Lauermann, 2019) and
(Gitmez and Molavi, 2018), where the receivers are voters. This chapter presents an
information design problem where the two receivers are candidates in a Downsian
election. Constraining signals to be publicly observed, I completely characterise the
optimal strategy for the sender, and show the sender always gains from persuasion.
Note that the state space in this model is uncountable (the unit interval), which means
(Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011)’s concavification tools do not apply. (Gentzkow and
Kamenica, 2016) explore infinite state spaces, but assume that the receiver’s action
only depends on his posterior mean. In contrast, my model can be rewritten as a
one-receiver problem where the receiver always selects the median of their posterior
belief.
I show that this problem is a relaxed form of an optimal gerrymandering problem,
with similarities to (Friedman and Holden, 2008). Accordingly, the optimal sender
strategy has a very similar structure, pooling very high and very low states. Another
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paper that highlights a connection between persuasion and a seemingly unrelated
problem is (Kolotilin and Zapechelnyuk, 2019), which shows that persuasion and
delegation problems are often equivalent.
2.3 Model
The sender designs a message strategy, or signal structure, that specifies a joint
distribution over messages (signals) contingent on the state of the world. After
receiving a message, each candidate updates their belief about θ and chooses a
policy platform. A candidate’s strategy must be optimal given their belief about
θ and the other candidate’s strategy. Assuming that the sender can choose the
most favourable equilibrium, we can write this as a maximisation problem subject to
obedience constraints.
The sender chooses a message strategy, which specifies a joint distribution p(.|θ) :
M×M → [0, 1] for θ ∈ Θ, and a strategy profile for candidates, {σi}i=1,2, to maximise
E(uS(a
w))
where aw is the winning policy defined as previously, subject to the following obedience
constraints:
For each i, for all mi that are sent with non-zero probability for some θ,






Pr(i wins |ai, aj, θ) p(mi, σ−1(aj)| θ) dFm(θ) daj
The term p(mi, σ−1(aj )| θ) dFm(θ) in the above statement gives the joint distribution
of θ, and aj given the message mi that player i observes. Thus, player i updates his
belief not only of the state of the world, but also of what information the other
candidate might have received. The statement above requires i’s policy to be optimal
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given this updated joint belief.
2.4 Public messages with full commitment
The sender designs a signal structure, and the signal realisation is publicly observed.
In other words, simply add the following constraint to the above problem: if mi 6= mj,
then p(mi,mj|θ) = 0. Since the candidates have a common prior and observe the same
signal, they must therefore update their beliefs in the same manner, and each choose a
median of the posterior. The best equilibrium for the sender is where both candidates
converge to the highest median for each posterior.
The sender’s problem can be rewritten thus:






(m) ≡ {t ∈ Θ : Pr(θ ≤ t |m) ≥ 1
2
and Pr(θ ≥ t |m) ≥ 1
2
} is the set of
medians2 of the posterior belief given message m.
First, I will argue that this is equivalent to a relaxed gerrymandering problem.
In a standard gerrymandering problem, a principal decides how to allocate a given
population with a given preference distribution F : θ → [0, 1] into constituencies
of a given size. Each constituency then elects a representative, and the principal
wants to maximise the average ideology of the representatives. 3 If we think of
2There are two ways of dealing with non-unique posterior medians. One is to only consider the
highest (most favourable) median, i.e. θ̂m(s) = sup θm(s), or the lowest (least favourable). Another
is to restrict the signal structure so that only posteriors with unique median are allowed. The signal
structure described later in Proposition 8 solves the sender’s problem in the most favourable case.
However, it is easy to construct arbitrarily similar signal structures that induce unique posterior
medians and achieve almost the same utility.
3The simplest form of this is when preferences are binary, i.e. θ ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 represents a
Democrat and 1 a Republican voter. Then the principal wants to optimally allocate voters so as
to elect as many Republican representatives as possible. The optimal solution famously involves
”packing and cracking”, whereby some constituencies are overwhelmingly Democrat and some have
just enough Republicans to make a majority.
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our prior distribution F (θ) as being analogous to the voter population F(θ) in the
gerrymandering problem, and fix some finite support for p(.|θ), then the sender’s
choice of p(m|θ) is equivalent to allocating voters of a given preference θ to each
constituency m ∈ M . In each constituency m, the elected representative is the
median θ 1
2
(m). The main difference here is that the support of p, instead of being
2
a fixed number of constituencies of equal size, can be chosen to be any (potentially 
uncountable) set of messages. Our maximisation problem therefore has more degrees 
of freedom than the usual gerrymandering problem.
This connection with the gerrymandering literature is, however, helpful in 
formulating the optimal signal structure, which is the limiting case of the 
solution found by (Friedman and Holden, 2008).
Proposition 8. Sender’s optimum. The following signal structure is the solution to 
the sender’s public persuasion problem, and achieves the maximal utility equal to 
E(uS(θ) | θ > θ 1 ).







+m) for all i,m
In other words, the sender’s optimal message strategy perfectly reveals θ’s quantile 
distance from the median of F . The sender optimally reveals exactly how extreme 
voter preferences are, but not in which direction. Faced with this uncertainty, 
candidates might as well choose the higher value out of the two possibilities.
      Under  this  optimal  strategy,  the sender  achieves a  utility equal  to E(uS(θ) | θ >
θ 1
2
). Cut the prior distribution in half at the median, then throw away the lower half.
Take the expectation over the remaining top half, and that is the sender’s utility.
Note that it is always strictly better than babbling, thus the sender always benefits
from persuasion. This is in contrast with cheap talk, where information revelation is
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impossible under some priors, and with the typical persuasion problem, where gains
from persuasion are not guaranteed.
Proposition 8 presents an interesting implication: the entire lower half of the
prior is irrelevant to the policy outcomes induced by the sender. This should not
be surprising, given the parallel to gerrymandering, since a gerrymander can always
suppress up to half of the electorate by cleverly placing them in constituencies where
they would be in the minority. Moreover, it allows us to draw the following inference:
Suppose that, before the Bayesian persuasion game is played, the sender is able to
engage in a public opinion campaign with the aim of influencing preferences. In other
words, the sender chooses a (potentially costly) action which changes the distribution
of the median voter, F , in the Bayesian Persuasion game. Then what types of changes
would be targeted by the sender? Any action that preserves the upper half of F is
pointless. In fact, the sender should target realisations of θ above the median. In the
gerrymandering case, this can be interpreted as ”preaching to the choir”, i.e. targeting
people whose preferences are already favourable to the sender, and making them more
extreme. In our case, it means inducing a thick upper tail in the distribution of the
median voter.
Suppose further that the sender can only induce a symmetric distribution F . Then
the more polarised F is, the better, as it entails higher E(uS(θ) | θ > θ 1
2
). Both the
lower and upper tails are made thicker, but the lower tail does not matter anyway, as
it will be optimally suppressed in the Bayesian persuasion game.
2.5 Private messages with full commitment
The sender’s problem becomes significantly more complex once private messages are
allowed. However, if discretised, it can be solved by linear programming, for a given
prior distribution. Solving numerically for the optimal sender strategy, I find that
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public messages are optimal even when unrestricted private messages are allowed. A 
sample code in R can be found in Appendix A.3.
Figures 2.4 to 2.6 show graphical renditions of the joint distribution of policies 
induced by the sender at optimum. First notice that only points on the 45 degree line 
are assigned non-zero probabilities. Furthermore, the densities reported mimic the
upper tail of the prior distribution in each case (except at the exact median where 
discretisation leads to a slightly smaller density). This confirms that the optimal
private message structure is indeed the optimal strategy described in Proposition 8.
2.6 Welfare Analysis
In this section, I study welfare implications for the median voter under quadratic 
utility. This is equivalent to average voter welfare if all voters have quadratic preferences
Uj = −(winning policy − θj )2, with θj symmetrically distributed around θ.
While the presence of the special interest increases the amount of information that
is potentially available to candidates, it may also lead to policy distortions. This is 
the classic bias-variance tradeoff. One could think of the implemented policy as an 
estimator for θ, so that the median voter’s welfare is equal to the mean squared error
of that estimator. It is well-known that the quadratic-loss function or MSE places 
equal weight on the bias and variance of an estimator.4 Hence, a special interest is
beneficial if and only if it increases policy precision around the median voter more 
than it increases bias.
Proposition 10 states, under public persuasion, this is never the case. In other 
words, with full commitment power, the sender is able to distort policy so severely
4This particular case is, however, slightly different from the classical framework where the 
parameter of interest, θ, is fixed, and variations in the estimator arise purely from sampling. Here, 
θ is drawn from a distribution, and the variance term is actually the covariance between θ and the 
policy. More precisely, we can rewrite E(a − θ)2 = V ar(a − θ) + (E(a − θ))2, where the first term 
includes the covariance, and the second term is the bias. The covariance simply measures how well 
a tracks θ on average.
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that it outweighs any informational benefit.
Proposition 10. The median voter’s welfare under public persuasion is strictly 
worse than under babbling.
For every message, the posterior is degenerate at two values, with the prior median 
between them. Under babbling, the policy is equal to the prior median, whereas under 
persuasion, the policy is at one extreme (the higher value). At every posterior, the 
average distance between the policy and θ is the same in both situations, but the 
variance is larger under persuasion. Since the median voter is risk averse, their welfare 
decreases.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents an information design problem faced by a sender who can 
manipulate candidates’ beliefs before a Downsian election. By pointing out similarities 
between this problem and gerrymandering, I fully characterise the optimal strategy 
and show that the sender will optimally reveal to both candidates precise information 
about the intensity, but not the direction, of the median voter’s preference. This 
optimal strategy is shown to be strictly welfare-decreasing for the median voter. From
a policy standpoint, this suggests that disclosure rules requiring all special interest 
communications with candidates to be made public are likely to be ineffective at 
improving the median voter’s welfare.
This chapter stands in stark contrast with the previous chapter, suggesting that 
understanding special interests’ degree of commitment power is crucial for making 
predictions. It also suggests a simple rule of thumb to distinguish between special 
interests with low and high commitment power: special interests that align themselves 
exclusively with one party or candidate are likely to have limited commitment, whereas 
those that interact equally with  all parties are likely to have  a relatively large commit-
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ment power. Furthermore, while the former may benefit the median voter, the latter 
always leaves the median voter strictly worse off.
The comparison between the first two chapters raises interesting points about real 
world special interests and their influence on American politics. For instance, an oft-
discussed example is Stephen Bannon, who led Donald Trump’s presidential campaign 
in 2016. This seems to broadly fit the description in Chapter One — a first-time 
campaign adviser with biased policy preferences, presumably with no commitment to 
truth-telling, who advises one candidate in opposition to the other. The welfare result 
in the previous chapter suggests that, insofar as providing information to the 
candidate, Mr. Bannon’s involvement may theoretically have benefitted the median 
voter. On the other hand, an example that seems to fit Chapter Two is the National 
Rifle Association (NRA), an interest group representing the interests of gun owners. 
The NRA is a well-established institution with long-standing ties to politicians on 
both sides of the aisle. The predictions in Chapter Two suggest that such organisations 
may be detrimental to the median voter, as they induce both candidates to adopt 
biased policies — leaving voters with no choice. Interestingly, this line of argument has 
long been adopted by opponents of the NRA, who claim that, should voters be given a 
choice, they would opt for a greater degree of gun control. A recent rift between the 
NRA and the Democratic party is likely to put this argument to the test.
This leaves open an interesting avenue for future research: studying how 
relationships between candidates and special interests develop over time. Examining 
these dynamic relationships is important in understanding not only the factors that 
affect the longevity of relationships between politicians and their advisers, but also the 
informational advantages or disadvantages faced by incumbents — and thereby the 




Figure 2·1: Optimal signal structure under θ ∼ Uniform[0, 1].
(Each square colour denotes a signal. Candidates’ policy is shown by
circle of corresponding colour).
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Figure 2·2: Policy as a function of median voter preferences
(Symmetric prior)
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Figure 2·3: Policy as a function of median voter preferences
(Skewed priors)
Figure 2·4: Optimal private signal structure (Uniform prior)
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Figure 2·5: Optimal private signal structure (Prior with increasing
density)




Gender and Group Decision-Making:
Evidence from City Councils in the
United States
(with Jesse Bruhn and Anna Weber)
3.1 Introduction
The participation of women in local government in the United States has increased 
significantly in the last decades. For instance, (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014) report
that around a third of mayoral elections attracted female candidates in the period 
1995-2005, up from less than 10% in the 1970s. This has been a gradual increase
rather than a result of any explicit policies such as quotas, in contrast to countries 
such as India. Although these numbers still reflect the continuing underrepresentation 
of women across the board in politics, they raise important questions about the
effect on public policy and the allocation of public spending, with United States local 
governments spending upwards of $1.6 trillion in 2016.1
Economic theory offers divergent predictions about the impact of female policymakers. 
On one hand, the median voter theorem (Downs, 1957) states that office-motivated 
politicians of either gender will, in equilibrium, enact policies that conform to the
1Source: U.S. Census Bureau. The reported number is for local general expenditures, which 
include spending on schools, health care services, and general administration (among other activities
in the general government sector) but exclude government-run liquor stores, utilities, and insurance 
trusts.
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median voter’s preference. Hence, no change is to be expected from an increase in 
female representation. On the other hand, more recent papers, such as (Besley and 
Coate, 1997)’s “citizen candidate” model, recognise that policymakers have 
preferences of their own and may not be able to commit to not implementing them 
once elected. This implies that, if male and female citizens have differing policy 
preferences, they may govern differently.
A large body of literature documents precisely such an effect in developing 
countries. Researchers working in this area have consistently found that female 
representation not only shifts the composition of public spending towards categories 
associated with broad female support, but can also have downstream effects on the 
aspirations and educational attainment of school age girls (See (Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo, 2004),(Beaman et al., 2009), and (Beaman et al., 2012)). However, studies that 
have looked for similar effects in western democracies have by and large come up 
empty handed.(Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014) find that in the United States, when a 
woman wins a close mayoral election against a man, there is no impact on the 
composition of public spending.
This chapter is the prelude to a larger project examining the effects of female 
representation in city councils in the United States. The municipal setting provides a 
novel dimension of female representation — intensive rather than extensive — in that 
an additional female council member only marginally affects the gender composition of 
the policymaking group. This is in contrast to most existing empirical studies on 
gender. Furthermore, while presently we focus on the effects on policy outcomes such 
as the size and composition of municipal spending, our aim is more broadly set on 
understanding not only the outcomes but the mechanisms that lead to them.
This chapter has three main contributions. First, we construct a new dataset 
linking city council election information with data from the records of proceedings
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of council meetings. Second, by exploiting close elections between male and female 
candidates, we estimate the effect of gender on policy in a new context — the city 
council — and find that an exogenous increase in the number of female council 
members has a weakly significant negative effect on per capita expenditure, but no 
significant effect on the composition of municipal spending. Third, we find no 
significant effect on the participation or success of other women in future elections.
Our results mirror existing literature in a few interesting ways. The null effect on 
spending composition recalls (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014)’s findings on the effect of 
female mayors, with a number of possible explanations. For example, men and women 
may not differ significantly in their policy preferences. Available evidence, however, 
contradicts this. The American National Election Studies reports some differences in 
male and female preferences for local goods, with results suggesting that women care 
relatively more about police, local elections and welfare programmes. Another 
potential explanation may be that the median voter theorem applies in this western 
setting, unlike in other developing countries that have been studied. A crucial element 
of the Downsian model rests in politicians’ ability to commit to a policy that is 
independent of their own preference. If western democratic institutions allow greater 
commitment power to politicians — for instance, through media scrutiny and greater 
accountability — the median voter theorem is more likely to hold. This, however, fails 
to explain the following result.
We find some evidence that increasing the number of female councillors decreases 
per capita total spending. Although the statistical significance of this effect is 
somewhat sensitive to bandwidth choice, the estimates are stable and economically 
large. This holds even after controlling for candidates’ previous experience in running 
for and holding office. Our result is closely related to a strand of literature that 
examines,  both theoretically  and empirically,  the relationship  between diversity and 
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public good provision, and more broadly between diversity and conflict (see, for 
example, (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) and (Ray and Esteban, 2017) for useful 
reviews). (Alesina et al., 1999) present a hypothesis that increased diversity in a 
society leads to lower public good provision through heightened disagreement about 
how to allocate public funds. In the context of city councils in the United States, 
(Beach and Jones, 2017) find that increased ethnic diversity in city councils in 
California decreases total municipal spending on public goods, which they interpret as 
evidence of a gridlock within the council.
In the following section, we develop a model of legislative deliberation which fleshes 
out two pieces of intuition on female representation (or more broadly, minority 
representation). The first, which we refer to as “self-censoring”, relates to the 
disincentive for a member of a minority to propose unpopular policies or voice her 
opinions. There is some experimental evidence on self-censoring; for example, 
(Coffman, 2014) finds that even when individuals are knowledgeable in a specific area, 
they systematically under-contribute to a group decision making process when the 
subject is outside of their stereotypical gender domain. A second effect, which we refer 
to as “pushback”, pertains to the fact that the majority may react strategically to a 
change in group composition. This may lead to increased disagreement within the 
group, with potentially negative consequences. For instance, (Bagues and Esteve-
Volart, 2010) document, in the context of Spanish civil service positions, that women 
who are randomly assigned to an evaluation committee with an above average share of 
women are, in fact, less likely to be hired. The main way in which this manifests in our 
model is with a decrease in men’s demand for public spending.
Whereas existing studies, including the present analysis, focus on policy outcomes, 
such as municipal spending budget and composition, our broader aim is to provide 
a glimpse into the decision-making process, in order to detect potential changes in
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strategic behavior and disagreement. Therefore, as we walk through this chapter, it
is helpful to keep in mind the next part of the project, which deals with records of
proceedings of city council meetings. By examining the minutes of council meetings,
we can measure the effect of female representation on the frequency with which
members of different genders participate in the discussion, how often they propose
or second motions, voting patterns and meeting length. This will enable us to get a
more complete understanding of gender dynamics in group policymaking.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
The following is a stylised model that illustrates our intuition for “self-censoring”
and “pushback”. Suppose that city council budgets are determined in a two-stage
deliberative process: first setting a total budget (either high or low), then choosing
between three possible allocations over public goods (m, f or a compromise good
x). The first stage is a simple majority vote between the two budget levels, and the
second involves a proposal followed by voting.
There are N members with stochastic preferences over allocations, which have two
possible realisations:
m  x  f or f  x  m
For simplicity, let each member’s preferences be independently distributed, and
identically within each gender. Assume that men are strictly more likely to have
preferences m  x  f than f  x  m, and the opposite for women.
Suppose that after the budget is decided, members’ preferences over allocations
are realised and a member is randomly chosen by nature to make a proposal. The
chosen member can either make a proposal at some marginal cost c > 0 or decline to
make a proposal. Let the compromise good be the status quo, which is implemented
if no proposal is made or if a proposal is rejected.
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Then each member i will make a proposal reflecting his or her true preference
θi = arg maxa∈{m,f} ui(a) if and only if
Pr( θi passes the vote )(ui(θi)− ui(x))− c ≥ 0
and decline to make a proposal otherwise.
Examining the expression above leads us to our first prediction. If men constitute
the majority in the council, then keeping everything else constant, a member who
favours the allocation m anticipates a higher probability of success for his or her
proposal. Therefore, men are overall more likely to make proposals than women.
Prediction 1. A male member of the council proposes motions more frequently
than a comparable female member.
Furthermore, as the gender composition of the council shifts to include more
women, the left-hand side in the above expression becomes larger for members who
favour allocation f , and smaller for those who favour allocation m. Two things
may happen: either it becomes worthwhile for members of all preferences to make
proposals, or no one makes a proposal. The former is a situation where diversity
opens up the conversation for all, whereas the latter shows increased polarisation
may shut down any discussion in favour of a compromise allocation.
In either case, the shift in gender composition leads to a movement away from the
male-oriented good m. From an ex-ante point of view, male members who control the
majority anticipate a lower expected utility. This leads to the following prediction.
Prediction 2. Increased female representation leads to a weakly lower total budget,
and a weak decrease in the probability that allocation m is chosen. The probabilities
with which allocations f and x are chosen may increase or decrease, depending on
whether female representation encourages or dampens members’ incentive to make
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proposals.
In subsequent sections, we describe the institutional setting for our empirical
study, followed by our identification strategy, and present our main results.
3.3 Setting
We focus on local governments at the municipal level: city/town councils, village
boards of trustees, and boards of alderpersons. Often the format is specified by the
state constitution. The jurisdiction and responsibilities of councils vary, but may
include police/fire protection, sanitation, local roads, parks and recreation, libraries,
and local zoning. (However, they do not include the funding or operation of schools,
which fall under the jurisdiction of school districts).
A typical council in our data consists of 4-7 members and a “mayor”. About half of
the council is elected every 1-2 years, either at-large or by district. Council members
are usually elected on non-partisan basis. We include the mayor as a member of the
council where available, but exclude elected administrative positions like Secretary,
Clerk, etc.
3.3.1 City Council Election Data
We collected election data by sending Freedom of Information Act requests to 3,513
cities. The list of cities was taken from the Annual Survey of State and Local
Government Finances (from the US Census Bureau), and consists of all municipalities
included in the 2009-2013 subsample. Individual FOIA requests were sent to local
governments to collect election data from 2008 to mid- 2017. Responses were received
in a variety of formats, including pdfs and links to websites. So far, we have entered
election data for 223 cities. For each city and election, we have the election date,
position (mayor/council), first and last names of candidates, vote counts and elected
candidates.
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We supplement our data with the California Election Data Archive (CEDA), also
used in (Beach and Jones, 2017), which provides the names and number of votes for
every candidate in every local government election occurring in our period of interest.
We requested candidate gender in our FOIA request but it was only provided by
a small number of cities. In order to impute a gender to each candidate, we follow
a name-based procedure inspired by Ferreira and Gyourko (2014). For each first
name, we compute the fraction of individuals born in 1950-1980 with that name who
are female, using name counts by year of birth and gender from the Social Security
Administration. For the worst winner and best loser in contested elections, we use
a 95% threshold to assign gender; if ambiguous (> 5% and < 95% female), the
individual’s gender is ascertained by an internet search. For rest of council, we use a
50% threshold to assign the gender.
For most of the sample, we are able to construct the council composition from
regular election data. (This excludes special elections and appointments between
regular elections after resignations or deaths). The modal number of elections to turn
over the whole council is 2. Therefore, starting from the second election included in
our data, we can reconstruct the council from winners of the past 2 elections.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics related to the elections in our sample. Around
80% of cities have had at least one race where the worst winner and best loser are
of opposite genders, and such races account for around 22% of all races. This leaves
us with approximately 1,400 gendered races. Figure 3.1 is a histogram of the vote
margins in the closest gendered race for each city, showing that a large number of
cities have had close gendered elections in our dataset.
3.3.2 Outcome Variables
We analyze municipal spending data from the Annual Survey of State and Local
Government Finances from the US Census Bureau, which provides data on expenditures
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and revenues by category. This we supplement with data from annual city budgets
for Californian cities, made available by the California City Controller’s Office. We
also construct some outcome variables using the election data described above.
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for expenditure in our sample in 2012, which is
the midpoint of our period of interest. Californian cities and the cities in our sample
show on average much higher expenditure than the typical city in the United States
census, so our results may not be representative of smaller or less affluent cities in
the United States. Cities with gendered elections also have higher expenditure on
average compared to a typical city in our sample.
3.4 Empirical Approach
We would like to estimate the causal effect of a change in female representation on a
variety of outcome variables. Absent any endogeneity concerns, the simplest possible
specification is the following panel OLS:
Yct = β1treatct + β2membersct + αc + τt + uct, (3.1)
where subscripts c and t refer to the city and year of observation, and treat could
be an indicator for any woman on the council, the count of female members, female
percentage of the council, etc. For a binary treatment, this is essentially a difference-
in-difference estimator.
However, the estimated coefficient β1 is likely to be biased, since we expect that
changes in female representation are correlated with changes in political views within
a city, or with council collaborative culture.
To deal with this concern, we implement a regression discontinuity approach,
focusing on races where the gender of the marginal council member is determined by
the result of a close race. Since an election may include multiple races and each race
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may have multiple winners, the analysis is conducted at the race level and considers 
only races where the worst winner and best loser are of opposite genders. For each 
race, we calculate the female margin of victory as a (signed) percentage such that a 
margin of zero indicates a tie. This allows us to zoom in on close gendered races where, 
around the cutoff of zero, the gender of the marginal council member is approximately 
random.
For observations where the margin of victory is within a bandwidth around a 
vote margin of 0, estimate:
Yrct = β1femwinrct + β2marginrct + β3(femwinrct ∗ marginrct) + αc + τt + urct (3.2)
where femwinrct, the treatment variable, is an indicator for whether the 
female candidate wins the race, whereas marginrct is the running variable.
Figure A.2 shows that the gender composition of the council is discontinuous in 
the vote margin. This indicates that the regression discontinuity is indeed valid. 
Furthermore, Tables A.12 and A.13 report the results of continuity checks for a 
number of predetermined and other variables, including election parameters and city 
population. Figures A.3 to A.7 show the corresponding binned scatter plots. Testing 
for vote manipulation around the cutoff (in accordance with Cattaneo, Jansson and 
Ma (2019)) returns a test statistic of 1.5341, with a p-value of 0.1250. The 
corresponding density plot is shown in Figure A.8.
3.5 Results
Table A.1 and A.2 show the results from equation 3.1 where the outcome 
variables are measures of total and per capita municipal expenditure. These 
tables show correlations between total expenditure and various measure of female 
representation. In particular, real per capita expenditure is strongly negatively 
correlated with the
44
fraction of women council members, with each percentage point increase associated
with $72 higher per capita expenditure. Table A.3 shows the outcomes of similar
regressions on the shares of expenditure devoted to different categories of spending.
There is a strong negative correlation between a number of measures of female
representation and the shares of expenditure allocated to health and hospitals, and
roads and parking. However, these estimates can in no way be interpreted as causal.
There are strong arguments for female representation being endogenous to expenditure
allocations. Although we include city fixed effects, changes in female representation
across time within a city is likely to be highly correlated with other changes in the
political climate, leading to correlations with expenditure patterns.
Therefore, we turn to equation 3.2 and report RD estimates showing the causal
impact of a female win in a close gendered race on expenditure. We report the results
estimated at the optimal bandwidth as per (Calonico et al., 2014), as well as half
and twice the optimal bandwidth. Table A.4 shows some evidence that a female win
decreases per capita expenditure by around 9% to 11%. The statistical significance
of this estimate varies by specification, but the estimated effect is consistently above
9% across the board. Our estimates are of very similar magnitude to the ones found
by (Beach and Jones, 2017), who report a 10% decrease in public goods expenditure
per capita following a win by an ethnic minority candidate. Table A.5 reports the
RD estimates under the optimal bandwidth under polynomial specifications. Figures
3.1 and 3.2 are binned scatter plots of the same expenditure variables or residuals
after taking out state and year fixed effects.
One potential concern for the validity of the RD estimates lies in the fact that
women are often less experienced in holding office than men. Therefore, we may
be concerned that the effect shown is not merely the result of electing a female
councillor but rather of electing a councillor who is both less experienced and female.
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Although we do not have data on candidate characteristics beyond name and gender,
the panel structure of our data allows us to check for repeated appearances of the
same name across elections. We construct variables that denote the number of times
each candidate previously sought or won office in the past, and use these as proxies
for experience. Therefore, our main specification shown in Table 3.3 includes these
controls. Comparing Table 3.3 with Table A.4 shows little difference in the RD
estimates before and after controlling for experience and city population.
Another potential explanation might be that the dip in per capita expenditure
is explained not by council budget deliberations, but by exogenous changes in the
city’s revenue base. To address this concern, we estimate estimate the effect of a
female win on total deficit, rather than total expenditure, and find a negative effect
of around $221 per capita (approximately 13% of the average total spending in our
sample). The results are shown in Table 3.4. In other words, the effect persists
even after accounting for revenue changes. As with the results on total spending, the
level of statistical significance is somewhat sensitive to the specification used, but the
estimates are consistently large and negative across all specifications. Binned scatter
plots of revenue and residuals are shown in Figure 3.3.
What is the effect of a female win on the allocation of expenditure? Table 3.5 shows
the results from running regressions for a number of expenditure categories that we
were able to consistently identify across data sources. Note that these shares may not
add to 1. In order to account for multiple testing, we test the joint hypothesis that the
β1 = 0 in all of the equations. (This is done under a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
(SUR) framework, which does not affect the point estimates as all our equations have
the same right-hand side variables, but allows for cross-equation hypotheses to be
tested). We find no evidence of any changes in expenditure composition, with or
without control variables. We repeat the procedure with log per capita expenditure
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on each category instead of expenditure shares, and again find no evidence of a change
in the way expenditure is allocated following a female win.
Next, we examine the effect of a close female win on the outcomes of the next
election, particularly outcomes for female candidates. Table 3.6 shows no evidence
that a female win impacts female participation or performance in the next election.
We were slightly puzzled by the negative, albeit insignificant, estimates suggesting
that a female win decreases female participation and success, but this effect goes away
once we remove the current best loser from the count. Since the majority of seats
turn over in two elections’ time, when a woman wins she essentially removes herself
from the next election, giving rise to the effect we observed. However, other women’s
participation and performance are not significantly affected.
It is interesting to consider the question of incumbency (dis)advantages in the
context of city council elections. Table 3.7 shows the effect of a close female win on
outcomes in the next two elections, in particular tracking the two candidates involved
in the close gendered race. A female candidate who just won goes on to run within
the next two elections 14pp to 17pp more than a female candidate who just lost, and
wins 13pp to 15pp more. This indicates a significant incumbency effect for women.
In contrast, male candidates in close gendered elections are not significantly affected
by their incumbent status. This result recalls similar findings by previous papers
and suggests a greater degree of voter learning concerning female office-holders. This
is, however, not due to female candidates’ inexperience, as the effect persists after
controlling for candidates’ experience. It is possible that voters have low ex-ante
expectations relative to female candidates’ true competence, although we cannot say
for certain.
Still on Table 3.7, we find that a close female win increases the best loser’s
participation (but not their performance) in the next two elections. Note that, at
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the cutoff, the identity of the best loser switches from female to male. This means
that men are less discouraged (or more encouraged) by a close defeat to participate
next time, compared to women in a similar situation. Although this is pure conjecture,
one possible explanation could be that women enter the race with a lower expectation
of winning — as underdogs, so to speak. Once this expectation is confirmed, they
are more likely to drop out. Men, on the other hand, are more likely to return next
election. Table 3.8 shows similar results when we include all future elections.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the effect of gender representation on policy at the municipal
level in the United States. We show evidence that supports previous findings that
gender representation does not affect the way municipal expenditure is allocated, or,
if anything, decreases per capita expenditure. Our hypothesis is that changes in the
gender composition of a council leads individuals to change their strategic behavior.
Women, even if elected into the council, may find it difficult to express opinions that
are at odds with the majority of the council; men, when faced with a larger minority,
may push back against opposing preferences, thus leading to increased disagreement
and a potential gridlock. We are excited about the next part of this project, which
involves highly detailed data obtained from the records of proceedings of city council
meetings. This will allow us to test our hypothesis directly and provide a more
comprehensive understanding of gender in policymaking.
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3.7.2 Tables
Table 3.1: Election Data Summary Statistics
By Race
Number % Races % Races with % Gender Contests Mean Number Mean Number Mean Votes
of Races Contested Gender Contest Women Win of Seats of Candidates per Seat
CEDA Data 2,746 0.904 0.287 0.496 2.00 4.52 9,297
From FOIA Requests 3,677 0.551 0.176 0.526 1.31 2.16 3,211
Combined 6,423 0.702 0.223 0.509 1.61 3.17 5,814
By Election
Number % Any % Any Gender Mean Number
of Elections Contested Race Contested Race of Races
CEDA Data 2,233 0.941 0.326 1.23
From FOIA Requests 1,277 0.791 0.381 2.88
Combined 3,510 0.886 0.346 1.83
By City
Number % Ever % Ever Gender Mean Number Mean Number Mean Years
of Cities Contested Race Contested Race of Races of Elections Covered
CEDA Data 498 0.996 0.773 5.51 4.48 7.52
From FOIA Requests 223 0.987 0.843 16.49 5.73 7.53
Combined 721 0.993 0.795 8.91 4.87 7.31
Table 3.2: 2012 Municipal Spending Summary Statistics
All Cities Cities with Election Data Cities with Close Gendered Election
CA Census Combined CA Census Combined CA Census Combined
Total Spending (in millions)
Total 126.83 25.15 27.61 110.13 89.09 103.50 131.72 111.82 125.58
Utilities 25.11 4.80 5.29 22.54 18.73 21.34 27.93 24.32 26.82
Parks and Recreation 5.27 0.98 1.09 5.07 4.93 5.02 5.71 6.48 5.95
Libraries 1.75 0.21 0.25 1.59 1.06 1.42 1.77 1.32 1.63
Air and Sea Ports 8.89 0.52 0.72 7.20 4.16 6.24 10.67 6.04 9.24
Police and Fire 28.01 3.97 4.55 26.83 17.12 23.77 31.35 21.19 28.21
Sewage and Waste 10.93 2.22 2.43 10.36 9.63 10.13 11.72 11.95 11.79
Roads and Parking 10.26 1.57 1.78 9.62 6.94 8.78 10.85 8.01 9.98
Health 5.17 1.21 1.31 0.81 1.56 1.05 1.11 1.97 1.37
Spending Per Capita
Total 4,569.67 1,647.24 1,717.70 4,578.36 1,926.24 3,742.45 1,582.93 1,841.89 1,662.91
Utilities 2,198.92 412.22 455.30 2,213.72 403.15 1,643.05 218.06 359.42 261.72
Parks and Recreation 100.85 60.19 61.17 100.94 101.68 101.17 98.49 116.17 103.95
Libraries 19.14 11.07 11.26 19.10 29.74 22.46 21.58 28.52 23.72
Air and Sea Ports 17.12 11.03 11.18 15.22 15.80 15.41 20.94 17.72 19.95
Police and Fire 691.57 238.59 249.51 693.70 311.86 573.35 413.13 303.55 379.28
Sewage and Waste 238.08 220.10 220.53 238.27 205.01 227.79 197.34 189.82 195.02
Roads and Parking 218.55 145.26 147.02 216.80 206.39 213.52 171.42 209.82 183.28
Health 39.50 39.62 39.61 34.75 86.14 50.94 14.51 74.44 33.02
Number of Cities 482 19,513 19,995 478 220 698 320 143 463
52
Table 3.3: RD Estimates: Effect of Close Female Win on Expenditure,
Controlling for Population and Winner’s Experience
Total Real Expenditure Total Log Expenditure
Optimal Half Optimal Twice Optimal Optimal Half Optimal Twice Optimal
Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
Female Winner -2105423.9 -8748458.1 15731494.6 0.120 0.0764 -0.0694
(14805855.5) (20866692.8) (13368402.3) (0.134) (0.160) (0.119)
Bandwidth 0.0660 0.0330 0.132 0.127 0.0635 0.254
Total Expenditure Per Capita Log Total Expenditure Per Capita
Optimal Half Optimal Twice Optimal Optimal Half Optimal Twice Optimal
Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
Female Winner -393.2 -624.8∗ -682.3∗ -0.101 -0.192∗∗ -0.111∗∗
(268.8) (334.1) (370.6) (0.0655) (0.0826) (0.0536)
Bandwidth 0.119 0.0595 0.238 0.164 0.0820 0.328
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses. All regressions include year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.4: RD Estimates: Effect of Close Female Win on Deficit,
Controlling for Population and Winner’s Experience
Total Real Deficit (000s) Deficit Per Capita
Optimal Half Optimal Twice Optimal Optimal Half Optimal Twice Optimal
Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
Female Winner -7,090.5∗ -12,262.2∗∗ -1,421.0 -221.3∗ -329.6∗∗ -243.1∗
(4266.1) (5662.5) (3720.5) (126.6) (143.9) (127.3)
Bandwidth 0.0660 0.0330 0.132 0.119 0.0595 0.238
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses. All regressions include year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: RD Estimates: Effect of Close Female Win on Expenditure
Composition, Controlling for Population and Winner’s Experience
Bandwidth 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250
Dependent Variable:
% Public Utility Expenditure -0.0145 -0.0152 -0.0131 -0.0141
(0.0124) (0.0114) (0.0102) (0.00928)
% Health and Hospital Expenditure 0.00344 0.00695 0.00479 0.00474
(0.0142) (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.00993)
% Parks and Recreation Expenditure 0.000360 0.00356 0.00385 0.00252
(0.00629) (0.00544) (0.00490) (0.00452)
% Library Expenditure -0.00103 -0.000925 -0.00216 -0.00210
(0.00232) (0.00194) (0.00169) (0.00152)
% Housing and Community Dev Expenditure -0.00241 -0.00528 -0.00552 -0.00255
(0.00785) (0.00678) (0.00617) (0.00594)
% Airports and Water Ports Expenditure -0.000253 -0.00111 -0.00605∗∗ -0.00647∗
(0.00258) (0.00313) (0.00301) (0.00358)
% Police and Fire Expenditure 0.0125 0.00675 0.00715 0.0105
(0.0127) (0.0112) (0.0100) (0.00906)
% Sewerage and Waste Expenditure 0.00677 0.00348 0.00366 0.00476
(0.0129) (0.0118) (0.0105) (0.00936)
% Correctional Expenditure 0.000189 -0.000754 -0.000658 -0.000360
(0.00176) (0.000971) (0.000872) (0.000815)
% Roads and Parking Expenditure 0.0119 0.0115 0.0104 0.00802
(0.00886) (0.00831) (0.00758) (0.00722)
Joint test 8.304 7.321 10.96 10.96
p-value 0.599 0.695 0.361 0.361
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses.
All regressions include year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: RD Estimates: Effect of Close Female Win on Next
Election
Bandwidth 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250
Dependent Variable:
Number of Candidates Next Election -0.0477 -0.224 -0.255 -0.264
(0.423) (0.400) (0.332) (0.303)
Number of Female Candidates Next Election -0.199 -0.256 -0.217 -0.242
(0.219) (0.207) (0.179) (0.165)
Number of Winners Next Election -0.00169 -0.0270 -0.0171 -0.0244
(0.138) (0.137) (0.113) (0.103)
Number of Female Wins Next Election -0.141 -0.144 -0.127 -0.140
(0.113) (0.123) (0.100) (0.0879)
Number of Female Candidates Next Election 0.00969 -0.0749 -0.0681 -0.0909
Besides Current Best Loser (0.217) (0.205) (0.179) (0.165)
Number of Female Wins Next Election -0.0368 -0.0536 -0.0429 -0.0569
Besides Current Best Loser (0.117) (0.123) (0.102) (0.0900)
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses.
All regressions include year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: RD Estimates: Effect of Close Female Win on Next Two
Elections, Controlling for Candidates’ Experience
Bandwidth 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250
Dependent Variable:
Best loser runs at least once in next 2 elections 0.0802∗ 0.0566 0.0802∗∗ 0.0688∗
(0.0480) (0.0413) (0.0379) (0.0352)
Worst winner runs at least once in next 2 elections 0.0726 0.109∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0968∗∗∗
(0.0461) (0.0409) (0.0377) (0.0351)
Male candidate runs at least once in next 2 elections 0.0131 0.0145 0.0132 -0.00842
(0.0477) (0.0423) (0.0393) (0.0373)
Female candidate runs at least once in next 2 elections 0.140∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0461) (0.0404) (0.0381) (0.0351)
Best loser wins at least once in next 2 elections 0.0378 0.0243 0.0246 0.0202
(0.0407) (0.0348) (0.0321) (0.0300)
Worst winner wins at least once in next 2 elections 0.0850∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0946∗∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0400) (0.0367) (0.0345)
Male candidate wins at least once in next 2 elections -0.00782 0.000942 -0.0139 -0.0399
(0.0431) (0.0377) (0.0350) (0.0327)
Female candidate wins at least once in next 2 elections 0.131∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.0418) (0.0367) (0.0337) (0.0312)
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses.
All regressions include year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: RD Estimates: Effect of Close Female Win on All Future
Elections, Controlling for Candidates’ Experience
Bandwidth 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250
Dependent Variable:
Number of times the best loser runs in the future 0.110 0.0858 0.118∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.0743) (0.0637) (0.0575) (0.0527)
Number of future wins by the best loser 0.0284 0.0115 0.0248 0.0239
(0.0565) (0.0493) (0.0455) (0.0421)
Number of times the worst winner runs in the future 0.111∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.0589) (0.0531) (0.0507) (0.0491)
Number of future wins by the worst winner 0.111∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.0979∗∗ 0.0993∗∗
(0.0586) (0.0525) (0.0490) (0.0472)
Number of future runs by the male candidate 0.0841 0.0609 0.0622 0.0543
(0.0685) (0.0603) (0.0568) (0.0531)
Number of future wins by the male candidate 0.0185 0.0202 0.00204 -0.0192
(0.0596) (0.0526) (0.0490) (0.0449)
Number of future runs by the female candidate 0.136∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.0648) (0.0574) (0.0534) (0.0493)
Number of future wins by the female candidate 0.121∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.0553) (0.0506) (0.0475) (0.0441)
Future wins conditional on running by the best loser -0.00556 -0.0669 -0.106 -0.106
(0.113) (0.101) (0.0876) (0.0852)
Future wins conditional on running by the worst winner -0.00836 0.0507 0.0221 0.0274
(0.0924) (0.0760) (0.0683) (0.0643)
Future wins conditional on running by the male candidate -0.0937 -0.131 -0.194∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.0867) (0.0839) (0.0759)
Future wins conditional on running by the female candidate 0.126 0.119 0.104 0.148∗∗
(0.0975) (0.0843) (0.0764) (0.0728)
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses. All regressions include year and state fixed effects.




A.1 Chapter 1: More results
A.1.1 Moderately Biased Sender
The model in Section 1 illustrates that political competition can generate endogenous
credibility for an extremely biased sender. In this section, I allow the sender’s bias
to be moderate, as in Crawford and Sobel (1982). I show that in some cases, the
equilibria in Section 1 are also equilibria for smaller bias. In particular, when the
prior is uniform, the set of equilibria under extreme bias is a subset of equilibria
under moderate bias.
Lemma 6. Consider the game in Section 1 with the following modification:
US(a
1, a2; θ) = −E((aw − θ − b)2
∣∣∣ a1, a2; θ)
Also, let σ be an equilibrium of the original game, such that the set of induceable
policies is has at most two elements, i.e. |AR| ≤ 2, where AR = {aR : ∃ θ s.t. aR =
σR(σSR(θ))}. Then σ is also an equilibrium of the modified game with b > 0.
Corollary. If θ ∼ Uniform[0, 1], then any equilibrium of the original game is also
an equilibrium of the modified game with moderate bias.
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A.1.2 Imperfectly Informed Sender
So far, I have assumed that the sender has perfect knowledge of the median voter’s 
preference. However, in reality it is doubtful that anyone could perfectly predict the 
outcome of an election. In this subsection, I assume that the sender observes an 
imperfect signal about θ.
Suppose there is a small probability that the sender’s signal is entirely 
uninformative. For instance, suppose that the sender observes the true state with 
probability 1 − ε, but with probability ε the sender receives a meaningless signal that 
is uniformly drawn from the state space. Then the only equilibrium is babbling.
To see why, remember that the sender’s credibility arises from pragmatism: there 
is no point in making a false recommendation if that policy will be defeated for sure. 
However, if the sender’s information is imprecise, any policy could win with a small 
probability! Even if the sender’s information suggests that the status quo will win, 
there is always a small chance that an exaggerated recommendation will bear fruit. 
This creates a small misalignment between the sender and receiver: the sender 
would like to recommend a high policy as long as it has any chance at all of winning, 
whereas the candidate is more cautious and prefers policies that are most likely to 
win.
This misalignment is so small, however, that small modifications to the model will 
eliminate it. Below, I consider one such modification: a small cost of sending a 
message. This assumption is entirely plausible in real world situations. In my model, 
even a small cost is enough to create credibility, even though the sender is extremely 
biased (has state-independent preferences). This is because most of the sender’s 
credibility already arises endogenously.
Senders with more precise information have more credibility in equilibrium. If the 
sender is perfectly informed, nothing else is needed. However, the more imprecise the 
sender’s information, the more important other considerations will be for credibility.
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This is in contrast with Crawford and Sobel (1982), where the precision of the
sender’s information does not matter for credibility (because agents’ best responses
only depend on the posterior mean after each signal). My model predicts that special
interests with precise information need not do much to convince politicians, whereas
equally biased senders with imprecise signals need to go to greater lengths to convey
similar information. Likewise, interests with imprecise information must be punished
harder when their recommendations lead to a loss.
Messages are almost costless Suppose that, instead of being completely costless,
all messages have a small cost c > 0 to the sender. However, there is one message,
m0 ∈M , that costs nothing — interpret that as ”no message”. Additionally, assume
that the candidate has a small bias towards high policies.
First, if the sender is perfectly informed, the equilibria that remain are exactly
the interval equilibria. Furthermore, ”no message” must signify a recommendation
for the status quo (lowest) policy.
If instead the sender receives an almost perfect signal, i.e. ε→ 0, the incentive to
exaggerate is outweighed by the cost of the message. The sender knows that the high
policy could win with non-zero probability, but that event is so unlikely that it is not
worth sending a message. For the candidate, receiving the message means that a high
policy is very likely to win, however there is still a small chance that the sender is
wrong, and the status quo might be what voters truly prefer. If the candidate only
cared about winning, they would deviate and choose a policy closer to the status quo
policy (instead of the high policy), just in case the sender was wrong. However, a
small upward bias will make sure they follow the recommendation.
Lemma 5. Suppose that σ is an interval equilibrium of the original cheap-talk
game. Then with each of the following modifications, σ is still an equilibrium, as
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long as σR(m0) = aU and c > 0 is small.
1. Small cost of sending a message, and small candidate bias.
US(σ; θ) = Pr(1 wins) uS(a










UR(σ; θ) = Pr(w = R |σ; θ) + β σi(σSR(θ)), where β > 0 is small.
2. Small cost of sending a message, small candidate bias, and imperfectly informed
sender.
Preferences as stated above, and:
S observes a signal s =

θ w.p. 1− ε,
x ∼ Uniform[0, 1] w.p. ε.
(S’s strategy is now a function of s instead of θ).
A.1.3 Two senders with Opposite Biases
Suppose that, instead of one extremely biased sender, there were two senders with
diametrically opposed preferences (increasing and decreasing) in policy. Then, it is
trivially true that perfect revelation by both senders is supported by an equilibrium.
Consider the following strategy profile: S1 and S2 each perfectly reveal the state.
Candidate 1 always chooses a policy equal to the state revealed by S1 and Candidate
2 likewise listens to S2. Then neither sender has an incentive to deviate, as there is
always at least one candidate who chooses a policy equal to the median voter’s bliss
point. Therefore that policy is guaranteed to win. Neither candidate has an incentive
to deviate, as deviating guarantees a loss.
This is akin to the ideal confrontational system which is at the basis of most
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democratic institutions, coming back to the Downsian idea that self-interested political
actors end up serving the interests of the median voter. The result, however, rests
on a number of strict assumptions, chiefly that both senders have access to the same
precise information. The model presented in Chapter One, on the other hand, is
more applicable whenever the special interests on one side of the argument have a
disproportionate informational advantage over the other. In the real world, this arises




Proposition 1: No public messages. If we restrict the sender’s strategy to public
messages (i.e. σS1 = σS2), then the only equilibrium is babbling, and both candidates
always choose θm, the median of F , regardless of messages.
Section 2.2 already has an informal proof of Proposition 1. That proof is valid if
the median given each posterior is unique. This need not be the case, however, if the
posterior is not continuous - in particular, if it assigns zero probability to middling
values. Here is a formal proof that takes this into account.
The intuition is as follows: for small θ, only the lower policy (between the two
candidates) matters, so S always induces the highest such policy. Therefore, the
lower policy is unique. For some moderate θ, only the higher policy (between the two
candidates) matters, and so S always induces the highest such policy, which means
the higher and lower policy cannot both be posterior medians unless they are equal.
Fix an equilibrium. By the median voter theorem, each candidate must, given
each message, choose a policy platform among the set of medians given the posterior,
and win with probability half. Formally,
For each i ∈ {1, 2} and for each m ∈M, σi(m) ∈ θm(m)
where θm(m) ≡
{
θ̂ ∈ Θ : Pr(θ ≤ θ̂ |m) ≥ 1
2




Now define the set of lower policies
A` = {a ∈ [0, 1] : a = min
i
σi(m) for some m}
Now let ā` = supA`. Fix any a ∈ A`\{ā`}. For all θ ≤ a, the sender strictly
prefers to induce (something arbitrarily close to) ā` rather than a, because in both
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cases the lower policy (between the two candidates) wins for sure. But then Pr(θ ≤
a| a is induced) = 0 and therefore a cannot be the median of the posterior given the
message that induces a.
Therefore, the only possibility is that A` = {a`} is a singleton. This means that,
after any message, at least one of the candidates must choose a`. We need to show
that both candidates always choose a`.
Suppose not. Define ah = sup{a ∈ [0, 1] : a = σi(m) for some m, i} to be the
highest policy on the equilibrium path. This policy must be a maximum, otherwise
when θ = 1, the sender’s optimal message does not exist. For all θ ∈ (a`+ah
2
, ah),
the sender must induce ah since it will win for sure. But this means that a` and
ah cannot both be medians of the posterior given the message that induces them.
Contradiction.
The last step is to show that the unique policy chosen, a, must be equal to θ 1
2
,
the median of F . Suppose not, then given some message the posterior must place
unequal mass above and below a. Then each candidate can deviate by choosing
instead a median of the posterior, winning with probability strictly higher than half.
Proposition 2: Babble to one, talk to the other. On the equilibrium path,
at least one candidate’s strategy must be independent of messages, i.e. ∃U ∈
{1, 2} such that σU(σSU(θ)) = aU ∀θ.
Suppose, by contradiction, that the sender induces at least two distinct policy
platforms, a`i < a
h
i , for each of the candidates in some equilibrium. W.l.o.g., let
ahi = supAi, where Ai = {ai : ∃ θ s.t. ai = σi(σSi(θ))}.
First, ahi must be induced for some θ and some i (i.e. a
h
i is a max, not just a sup,
for some i), otherwise the sender’s best response does not exist when θ ≥ max{ah1 , ah2}.
Fix that i. For j 6= i, the sender induces a`j only if it loses to ahi . (If for some θ,




and something arbitrarily close to ahj .) Then after receiving message a
`
j, candidate j
knows that i is playing ahi and that a
`
j must lose for sure. So j can deviate profitably




Proposition 3: Uninformed candidate competes at lower end. Let U denote
the candidate whose strategy is independent of messages, and let R denote the other.
Then aU = inf AR, where AR = {aR : ∃ θ s.t. aR = σR(σSR(θ))}.
Denote a`R ≡ inf {aR : ∃ θ s.t. aR = σR(σSR(θ))}.
Suppose aU < a
`





, R must win, otherwise the sender is
not playing best response. Then U can deviate profitably by choosing a′U = a
`
R − ε,
where ε is arbitrarily small.
Suppose aU > a
`
R. Then there exist some θ for which the sender induces aR < aU .
Fix such an aR. If given aR is induced, R never wins, then R can do strictly better by
choosing aU . If R sometimes wins, then the sender can deviate by inducing something
strictly higher than aR when aR would have won. (There must exist at least two
inducible actions for R, if aU > a
`
R, because otherwise the candidates are not playing
best response).




Suppose aU > θ 1
2
. First note that aU must be a median of the posterior conditional
on the sender recommending aU to R, otherwise R could deviate by a small amount
and win with probability strictly greater than 0.5. Now there must be some aR ∈
AR\{aU} such that the posterior (given S recommends aR) assigns greater than half
probability to θ < aU . Since aR > aU by Proposition 3, R wins less than half of the
time, and R can deviate to some policy below aU and win strictly more than half the
time.
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Proposition 5: Finitely many messages. Assume F is a non-doctrinaire prior,
i.e. f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (0, 1). The set of policy platforms for R that are induced in
equilibrium, AR = {aR : ∃ θ s.t. aR = σR(σSR(θ))}, is finite.
Note: f(θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (0, 1) is stronger than full support, but is satisfied under
full support and single-peakedness. Note that f(θ) is allowed to be 0 at the extremes.
First we make the following claim.
Claim: For all a > aU ,
sup{aR ∈ AR : aR < a} < a and is a max .
i.e. the highest element that is strictly smaller than a exists.
First, suppose sup{aR ∈ AR : aR < a} = a for some a. Then when θ = aU+a2 ,
S’s optimal strategy does not exist, because S can deviate to inducing a policy that
is arbitrarily close below a that can win for sure. Now, suppose that the sup is not
a max. Then set a′ = sup{aR ∈ AR : aR < a} and apply the first part of the claim.
Contradiction.
Suppose AR is infinite. Construct a series of arbitrarily small upward deviations
for U, the uninformed candidate, as follows.
Define the function h : (aU , 1]→ AR\{aU} by saying h(a) = max{aR ∈ AR : aR <
a}. Starting with a0 = h(1), let at = h(at−1) for all t. Since AR is infinite, this gives
us an infinite series of strictly decreasing elements, from the highest element of AR
to the lowest. Now let εt =
1
2
min1≤k≤t{at−1 − at} > 0.




when θ happens to be just below aU+aU+ε
2






(Remember, at θ just above ak+aU
2
, R would usually just win, but now U wins instead).
As εt → 0, this sum grows to infinity, and the deviation is profitable.
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Lemma 1 If θ ∼ Uniform[0, 1], then AR is at most a doubleton. This means
that in equilibrium, the sender recommends one out of a set of at most two policy
platforms to the informed candidate.
Suppose not, i.e. |AR| ≥ 3. Then U can deviate by choosing a′U = aU + ε instead.
From Proposition 3 and 5, we know that aU = minAR. Also, aU is the median of the
posterior on θ conditional on R choosing aU (i.e. conditional on σR(σSR(θ)) = aU), by
































. The second term refers to the gain when σR(σSR(θ)) 6= aU . The sender
recommends aR ∈ AR\{aU} whenever θ > aU+aR2 , i.e. whenever aR wins against aU .
So for U, deviating by ε means pushing the cutoff for a win by 1
2
ε and capturing those
θ between the old and new cutoffs. There is a cutoff for each aR ∈ AR\{aU}, so add
up the gains from moving all of them.
Lemma 2. Interval equilibria. If θ ∼ Uniform[0, 1], the following is an equilibrium
iff a` ∈ [14 ,
1
3
] and ah = 3a`.
Rename the candidates R,U ∈ {1, 2}, where R 6= U , to denote who receives
information (R) and who receives a babbling message (U). Fix some arbitrary mU ∈










σU(m) = aU = a` for all m ∈M, with prior belief after every m.
σR(m) =

a` for all m ∈M`, with belief θ ∼ Uniform[0, a`+ah2 ],
ah for all m ∈Mh, with belief θ ∼ Uniform[a`+ah2 , 1].
It is easy to show that each player is playing best response given others’ strategies.
When θ < a`+ah
2
, S must choose between inducing aR = a` or aR = ah. Since ah
cannot win anyway, S is indifferent between all messages. When θ ≥ a`+ah
2
, ah can
win so it is strictly optimal to induce ah.




lower probability of winning. For R, there are two possible posterior beliefs about




and aU is the median of that posterior, so just like under Hotelling-Downs, playing




guarantees a win with probability 1. So it is optimal.
Lemma 3. Sender-optimal equilibrium. If θ ∼ Uniform[0, 1], then the following
is an equilibrium, and it achieves the highest equilibrium expected payoff for the
sender.
Fix some arbitrary mU ∈ M . Also fix a partition {M1,M2} of M , and arbitrary
elements m1 ∈M1 and m2 ∈M2.
σS(θ) =

(mU ,m1) if θ ∈ [0.25, 0.75),
(mU ,m2) otherwise.




0.5 for all m ∈M1, with belief θ ∼ Uniform[0.25, 0.75),
1 for all m ∈M2, with posterior given θ ∈ [0, 0.25) ∪ [0.75, 1].
If uS is linear, this equilibrium gives the sender expected utility Eθ(US(σ
∗; θ)) =
0.625.
It is easy to show that the above is an equilibrium. To show that it is the
best equilibrium for the sender, we refer to Lemma 1 which implies that that any
informative equilibrium has exactly two induceable policies for R. Since, in equilibrium,
each induceable policy wins iff the median voter prefers it to the other, we can
easily show that the sender’s utility is increasing in both induceable policies. In
the above equilibrium, the higher induceable policy is as high as possible at 1. Then
it suffices to show that, no matter what the higher induceable policy is, the lower
policy minAR = aU ≤ 12 in any equilibrium.
Suppose that aU >
1
2
in some equilibrium. First, aU must be the median of R’s
posterior after receiving a recommendation to choose policy aU . (Otherwise, R would
deviate). Also, name the other induceable policy aR, where aR > aU by Proposition 3.
Then for R to follow a recommendation of aR, it must be that Pr(θ > aU |σSR(θ) =
aR) ≥ 12 , otherwise it’s better for R to deviate to aU − ε. Combining these two
statements, we must have that Pr(θ > aU) ≥ 12 , which under Uniform distribution
means aU ≤ 12 .
Finally, note that any equilibrium where the set of induceable policies is {1
2
, 1} is
best for the sender.
Lemma 4. Welfare If θ ∼ Uniform[0, 1] and uS is linear, then any non-babbling
equilibrium gives weakly higher utility to the sender and the informed receiver, and
strictly higher utility to the median voter, than the babbling equilibrium.
By Lemma 1, a non-babbling equilibrium has exactly two on-the-equilibrium-path
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because otherwise U would deviate to 1
2
. Also note that a1 is
implemented if and only if θ ≥ a1+a2
2
.
Under babbling, the implemented policy is constant at 1
2






to the sender, informed receiver and median voter respectively.











, then U could deviate profitably to slightly above a2,
which increases U’s winning probability from a2 to 1 − a1). The informed receiver’s
utility is at least 1
2
because otherwise, he can deviate to a constant policy of 1
2
, which
guarantees him a utility of at least 1
2
. That the median voter’s utility is strictly higher
than 1
2
can be shown by simple algebra.
Proposition 6a. Babble if f is strictly increasing. If the prior density f is
strictly increasing in θ, babbling is the only equilibrium.





Now consider a small deviation for U , where U chooses aU + ε instead of aU . As
















Proposition 6b. Non-babbling equilibrium if f is weakly decreasing. If the
prior density f is decreasing in θ, a non-babbling equilibrium exists.
The proof is constructive. It is easy to show that there exists an interval equilibrium
with two policies, a` = median(θ | θ < 12) and ah = 1 − a`, where S reveals whether




Proposition 7. Symmetric single-peaked prior. Suppose the prior f is single-
peaked and symmetric around θ = 1
2
. Then a non-babbling equilibrium exists.
Again, the proof is constructive. It is easy to show that there exists an equilibrium








and ah = 2(1− x)− 12 .




Proposition 8. Sender’s optimum. The following signal structure is the solution
to the sender’s public persuasion problem, and achieves the maximal utility equal to
E(uS(θ) | θ > θ 1
2
).







+m) for all i,m
First, we can show that this signal structure achieves utility equal to E(uS(θ) | θ >
θ 1
2
). First remember that, for any random variable x with distribution G, we can
define G(x) as another random variable and G(x) ∼ Uniform[0, 1]. Now define
u = uS(θ) as a random variable with distribution G(u).





















= E(uS(θ) | θ > θ 1
2
)
Then we need to show that E(uS(θ) | θ > θm) is, in fact, an upper bound on the
sender’s utility. Do this in two steps:
1. Define a subset of F to be a function G : Θ→ [0, 1] s.t. for all x ≥ x′,












≤ E(uS(θ) | θ > θm)
In other words, take any half of the θ population, and their average is no higher
than the average of the top half of the population.
Proof: Define the top half of F to be the subset F 1
2
such that F 1
2






assigns zero probability to all θ below the median of F , but preserves density
f for all θ above the median). It is easy to show that, if G 6= F 1
2
is a subset of
F and if G(1) = 1
2
, then F 1
2
FOSD G. That’s because F 1
2
already assigns the
maximum possible probability to high values of θ.
2. Now suppose there exists a signal structure that achieves a utility strictly higher
than E(uS(θ) | θ > θ 1
2
). Then construct a subset of F which consists of all the
realisations of θ above each posterior median. That subset has probability 1
2
and average higher than u, which contradicts 1.




(θ) ≡ min{ 0 , Fm(θ)− 1
2
}.







Since by definition, Fm1
2
(θ) = 0 for all θ < θ 1
2
(m), the above expression is smaller
























(θ)Pr (m) dm. We can show trivially that G(1) = 1
2
. We can






















We already established that the RHS was larger than u, which is larger than E(uS(θ) 
| θ > θm). Contradiction.
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A.3 Chapter 2: Optimal private signal: Example code in R
1 #Star t with number o f d i s c r e t e po in t s
2 N<−15
3 #Prior
4 p r i o r <− rep ( (1 /N) , t imes=N) #Uniform d i s t r i b u t i o n , but we can do
anything
5 p r i o r <− p/sum(p) #Just to make sure i t adds up to 1 , but should not
matter at a l l
6
7 #The dimensions are s1 , s2 and theta
8 ar r <− array ( dim=c (N,N,N) )
9
10 #Winner g iven s1 , s2 , theta
11 w <− ar r
12 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
13 w[ , , i ] <− ( 0 . 5 ) ∗upper . t r i (w[ , , i ] , d iag = TRUE) +
14 ( 0 . 5 ) ∗upper . t r i (w[ , , i ] , d iag = FALSE)
15 }
16 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
17 f o r ( j in 1 :N) {
18 f o r ( k in 0 : min (N, max(2 ∗ i−j , 0 ) ) ) {




23 #Tie when e q u i d i s t a n t from theta
24 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
25 f o r ( j in max(2 ∗ i−N, 0 ) : i ) {
26 w[ j , ( 2 ∗ i−j ) , i ] <− 0 .5




31 #Expected winning p o l i c y
32 #F i r s t s t a t e the p o l i c i e s o f each candidate
33 a1 <− ar r
34 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
35 a1 [ i , , ] <− ( i −1)/ (N−1)
36 }
37 a2 <− ar r
38 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
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39 a2 [ , i , ] <− ( i −1)/ (N−1)
40 }
41
42 #Expected winning p o l i c y
43 aw <− w∗a1 +(1−w) ∗a2
44
45 #Sender ’ s u t i l i t y i s sum( ar r ∗aw) , where a r r i s j o i n t d i s t .
46 #I f u S i s not l i n e a r , we need to apply i t to a l l e lements o f a1 , a2
47 #So our c o e f f i c i e n t s in o b j e c t i v e func t i on are (aw) in vec to r form
48 aw <− as . vec to r (aw)
49 #Then need c o n s t r a i n t matrix , i n c l u d i n g the f a c t that each marginal
50 #of theta has to add up to f ( theta )
51
52 #Then we can use lpSo lve to s o l v e i t
53
54 #Constra int matrix
55 #Fir s t , f o r each theta , the ar r e lements f o r that theta add up to
56 #f ( theta ) , which could be 1/N i f uniform .
57 #Then , we need i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y f o r each ac t i on f o r j
58
59 #Fir s t , I need a vec to r that ’ s 1 only f o r one theta , 0 f o r o the r s
60 C1 <− matrix (0 , nrow=N, nco l=(Nˆ3) )
61 f o r (n in 1 :N) {
62 C1 [ n , ( ( n−1)∗ (Nˆ2)+1) : ( n∗ (Nˆ2) ) ] <− 1
63 }
64
65 #Now rbind with obedience c o n s t r a i n t s
66 #Obedience c o n s t r a i n t : Given each ac t i on recommended , i t ’ s not
67 #b e t t e r to do another ac t i on
68 #An act i on i s a row f o r p laye r 1 , a column f o r p laye r 2
69
70 C2 <− matrix ( nrow=(Nˆ2) , nco l=(Nˆ3) )
71 f o r (n in 1 :N) { #recommended a c t i o n s
72 f o r ( i in 1 :N) { #d e v i a t i o n s
73 d <− array (0 , dim=c (N,N,N) )
74 d [ , n , ] <− 1−w[ , n , ] − (1−w[ , i , ] )
75 C2 [ ( ( n−1)∗N+i ) , ] <− as . vec to r (d)
76 }}
77 C3 <− matrix ( nrow=(Nˆ2) , nco l=(Nˆ3) )
78 f o r (n in 1 :N) { #recommended a c t i o n s
79 f o r ( i in 1 :N) { #d e v i a t i o n s
80 d <− array (0 , dim=c (N,N,N) )
76
81 d [ n , , ] <− w[ n , , ] − w[ i , , ]
82 C3 [ ( ( n−1)∗N+i ) , ] <− as . vec to r (d)
83 }}
84
85 C <− rbind (C1 , C2 , C3)
86 C <− t (C)
87 #Apparently t ranspos ing the c o n s t r a i n t s matrix f i r s t makes i t qu i cke r
88 #Now what are the RHS va lues f o r the c o n s t r a i n t s
89 #For C1 , i t ’ s j u s t f ( theta )
90 #For C2 and C3 , i t ’ s 0
91
92 cons <− rep (0 , t imes=(N+2∗Nˆ2) )
93 cons [ 1 :N] <− p r i o r
94
95 # Load lpSo lve
96 r e q u i r e ( lpSo lve )
97
98 #C o e f f i c i e n t s o f obj fn : aw
99 #Const ra in t s : C
100 #Const ra in t s RHS: cons
101
102 # Dire c t i on o f the c o n s t r a i n t s
103 cons d i r e c t i o n <− vec to r ( l ength=(N+2∗Nˆ2) )
104 cons d i r e c t i o n [ 1 :N] <− ”=”
105 cons d i r e c t i o n [ (N+1) : (N+2∗Nˆ2) ] <− ”>=”
106
107 # Find the optimal s o l u t i o n
108 optimum <− lp ( d i r e c t i o n=”max” ,
109 o b j e c t i v e . in = aw ,
110 const . mat = C,
111 const . d i r = cons d i r e c t i o n ,
112 const . rhs = cons ,
113 t ranspose . c o n s t r a i n t s=FALSE)
114
115 # Print s t a t u s : 0 = succes s , 2 = no f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n
116 pr in t ( optimum$ s t a t u s )
117
118 # Display arg max
119 best s o l <− optimum$ s o l u t i o n
120 pr in t ( bes t s o l )
121
122 # Check the value o f o b j e c t i v e func t i on at optimal po int
77
123 pr in t ( paste ( ”Sender ’ s u t i l i t y ” , optimum$ objva l , sep=”” ) )
124
125 #Check that a l l non−d iagona l e lements ( p r i v a t e messgaes )
126 #of the arg max are zero
127 o f f d i a g <− array (1 , dim=c (N,N,N) )
128 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
129 o f f d i a g [ i , i , ] <− 0
130 }
131 anyprivatem <− max( best s o l ∗ as . vec to r ( o f f d i a g ) )
132 pr in t ( anyprivatem )
78
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Figure A·3: Continuity Check: Gender Composition of Sitting
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A.4.2 Tables
Table A.1: Panel Specification: Real and Log Total Expenditure
Correlations with Female Representation
Real Total Expenditure ($) Log Total Expenditure
Any Woman on Council -7956847.0 -8860863.3 -5574080.2 -0.0177 -0.0262 -0.0235
(9616089.5) (11565532.0) (9742713.1) (0.0190) (0.0229) (0.0193)
Percent of Council Women -7484174.1 3698156.1 0.00152 0.0346
(21850868.6) (26278358.4) (0.0432) (0.0520)
No. of Women on Council -5856336.3 0.00646
(3986492.7) (0.00791)
2+ Women on Council 2897045.4 0.0205
(7997305.2) (0.0159)
3+ Women on Council -11182897.8 0.00993
(10027189.4) (0.0199)
Observations 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses. All regressions include year and city fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.2: Panel Specification: Real and Log Per Capita Expenditure
Correlations with Female Representation
Real Per Capita Expenditure ($) Log Per Capita Expenditure
Any Woman on Council -1007.5 1115.3 -811.8 -0.0189 -0.0304 -0.0261
(1236.0) (1485.0) (1256.3) (0.0187) (0.0225) (0.0190)
Percent of Council Women -7276.3∗∗∗ -8683.8∗∗ 0.00861 0.0470
(2805.7) (3374.2) (0.0426) (0.0512)
No. of Women on Council -433.4 0.00751
(514.2) (0.00780)
2+ Women on Council -1085.1 0.0258∗
(1031.2) (0.0156)
3+ Women on Council 496.7 0.0111
(1292.9) (0.0196)
Observations 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses. All regressions include year and city fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Panel Specification: Shares of Expenditure Categories
Correlations with Female Representation
Share of Expenditure on Public Utility Share of Expenditure on Health and Hospitals
Any Woman on Council -0.00202 0.000214 -0.00112 -0.00654∗∗∗ -0.00638∗∗∗ -0.00650∗∗∗
(0.00443) (0.00533) (0.00450) (0.00149) (0.00178) (0.00151)
Percent of Council Women -0.00889 -0.00916 -0.00888∗∗ -0.000696
(0.0101) (0.0121) (0.00347) (0.00415)
No. of Women on Council -0.000735 -0.00147∗∗
(0.00184) (0.000619)
2+ Women on Council -0.00143 -0.000675
(0.00370) (0.00125)
3+ Women on Council -0.000758 0.000474
(0.00463) (0.00155)
Observations 3952 3952 3952 3952 3952 3487 3487 3487 3487 3487
Share of Expenditure on Parks and Recreation Share of Expenditure on Libraries
Any Woman on Council 0.000353 -0.000265 0.000475 -0.000526 -0.00137 -0.000491
(0.00193) (0.00232) (0.00196) (0.000832) (0.000997) (0.000844)
Percent of Council Women 0.00220 0.00253 0.00178 0.00352
(0.00439) (0.00527) (0.00191) (0.00229)
No. of Women on Council 0.000486 0.000237
(0.000801) (0.000344)
2+ Women on Council -0.00126 0.000509
(0.00161) (0.000691)
3+ Women on Council 0.00337∗ -0.000252
(0.00201) (0.000863)
Observations 3923 3923 3923 3923 3923 3658 3658 3658 3658 3658
Share of Expenditure on Housing and Community Development Share of Expenditure on Airports and Water Ports
Any Woman on Council -0.00344 -0.00140 -0.00263 -0.000451 -0.00110 -0.000603
(0.00290) (0.00349) (0.00295) (0.000723) (0.000865) (0.000733)
Percent of Council Women -0.0101 -0.00831 0.00134 0.00275
(0.00659) (0.00792) (0.00168) (0.00201)
No. of Women on Council -0.00172 0.000219
(0.00121) (0.000299)
2+ Women on Council -0.00353 0.000735
(0.00242) (0.000604)
3+ Women on Council -0.00119 0.000332
(0.00303) (0.000747)
Observations 3953 3953 3953 3953 3953 3475 3475 3475 3475 3475
Share of Expenditure on Police and Fire Share of Expenditure on Sewerage and Waste
Any Woman on Council 0.000983 -0.00473 -0.000472 -0.00423 -0.00278 -0.00381
(0.00384) (0.00461) (0.00390) (0.00336) (0.00402) (0.00340)
Percent of Council Women 0.0175∗∗ 0.0235∗∗ -0.00968 -0.00611
(0.00872) (0.0105) (0.00782) (0.00937)
No. of Women on Council 0.00239 -0.00162
(0.00159) (0.00139)
2+ Women on Council 0.00599∗ -0.00216
(0.00319) (0.00282)
3+ Women on Council 0.00237 -0.000383
(0.00399) (0.00349)
Observations 3837 3837 3837 3837 3837 3487 3487 3487 3487 3487
Share of Expenditure on Corrections Share of Expenditure on Roads and Parking
Any Woman on Council 0.0000475 -0.000108 0.0000655 0.00862∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.00936∗∗
(0.000752) (0.000870) (0.000770) (0.00415) (0.00497) (0.00421)
Percent of Council Women 0.000647 0.000784 -0.00956 -0.0294∗∗
(0.00191) (0.00221) (0.00961) (0.0115)
No. of Women on Council 0.0000987 -0.00156
(0.000253) (0.00172)
2+ Women on Council 0.0000500 -0.00340
(0.000600) (0.00345)
3+ Women on Council 0.0000851 -0.00839∗
(0.000631) (0.00429)
Observations 1161 1161 1161 1161 1161 3535 3535 3535 3535 3535
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses. All regressions include year and city fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: RD Estimates: Effect of Close Female Win on
Expenditure, Without Controls
Total Real Expenditure Total Log Expenditure
Optimal Half Optimal Twice Optimal Optimal Half Optimal Twice Optimal
Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
Female Winner 6403567.3 6699025.7 116626475.5 0.0539 0.0378 -0.0716
(28511351.1) (39251614.8) (104797748.5) (0.159) (0.186) (0.140)
Bandwidth 0.0670 0.0335 0.134 0.160 0.0800 0.320
Total Expenditure Per Capita Log Total Expenditure Per Capita
Optimal Half Optimal Twice Optimal Optimal Half Optimal Twice Optimal
Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
Female Winner -443.6 -644.3∗ -670.6∗ -0.0926 -0.204∗∗ -0.124∗∗
(302.5) (362.8) (354.4) (0.0687) (0.0844) (0.0558)
Bandwidth 0.123 0.0615 0.246 0.148 0.0740 0.296
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses. All regressions include year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.5: RD Polynomial Estimates: Effect of Close Female Win on
Expenditure, Controlling for Population and Winner’s Experience
Total Real Expenditure Total Log Expenditure
Female Winner -6814303.8 -2438897.7 -4127122.1 -0.0119 -0.272 -0.609∗∗
(20450422.4) (23923400.0) (27330327.9) (0.178) (0.239) (0.289)
Polynomial 2 3 4 2 3 4
Total Expenditure Per Capita Log Total Expenditure Per Capita
Female Winner -555.6∗ -620.7∗ -498.1 -0.166∗ -0.258∗∗ -0.307∗∗
(323.7) (339.4) (310.7) (0.0937) (0.110) (0.125)
Polynomial 2 3 4 2 3 4
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses.
All regressions include year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: RD Estimates: Effect of Close Female Win on Expenditure
Composition
Bandwidth 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250
Dependent Variable:
% Public Utility Expenditure -0.0162 -0.0154 -0.0138 -0.0136
(0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0102) (0.00965)
% Health and Hospital Expenditure 0.00415 0.00709 0.00524 0.00524
(0.0139) (0.0120) (0.0112) (0.00985)
% Parks and Recreation Expenditure 0.000136 0.00327 0.00377 0.00203
(0.00631) (0.00545) (0.00489) (0.00452)
% Library Expenditure -0.00104 -0.000806 -0.00246 -0.00199
(0.00230) (0.00193) (0.00168) (0.00151)
% Housing and Community Dev Expenditure -0.00202 -0.00503 -0.00492 -0.00236
(0.00779) (0.00676) (0.00613) (0.00593)
% Airports and Water Ports Expenditure -0.000388 -0.000562 -0.00697∗ -0.00517
(0.00282) (0.00324) (0.00372) (0.00411)
% Police and Fire Expenditure 0.0109 0.00657 0.00680 0.00981
(0.0127) (0.0112) (0.0100) (0.00910)
% Sewerage and Waste Expenditure 0.00750 0.00362 0.00406 0.00461
(0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0104) (0.00927)
% Correctional Expenditure 0.000175 -0.000935 -0.000680 -0.000283
(0.00139) (0.000682) (0.000658) (0.000679)
% Roads and Parking Expenditure 0.0122 0.0110 0.0114 0.00757
(0.00885) (0.00838) (0.00767) (0.00728)
Joint test 8.155 8.479 11.63 8.180
p-value 0.614 0.582 0.311 0.611
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses.
All regressions include year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: RD Estimates: Effect of Close Female Win on Log
per Capita Expenditure Categories, Controlling for Population and
Winner’s Experience
Bandwidth 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250
Dependent Variable:
Log Per Capita Public Utility Expenditure -0.272 -0.232 -0.267 -0.316
(0.306) (0.271) (0.243) (0.221)
Log Per Capita Health and Hospital Expenditure -0.159 -0.0525 -0.00181 -0.0370
(0.216) (0.184) (0.165) (0.152)
Log Per Capita Parks and Recreation Expenditure -0.155 -0.0728 -0.0484 -0.0836
(0.131) (0.124) (0.115) (0.107)
Log Per Capita Library Expenditure -0.240 -0.162 -0.282∗ -0.321∗∗
(0.216) (0.189) (0.168) (0.157)
Log Per Capita Housing and Community Dev Expenditure -0.0964 -0.0275 -0.0364 -0.0364
(0.124) (0.111) (0.0994) (0.0966)
Log Per Capita Airports and Water Ports Expenditure 0.0585 -0.0523 -0.144 -0.164
(0.170) (0.149) (0.144) (0.146)
Log Per Capita Police and Fire Expenditure -0.0372 -0.0206 -0.0659 -0.0591
(0.0890) (0.0759) (0.0629) (0.0592)
Log Per Capita Sewerage and Waste Expenditure -0.0747 -0.0814 -0.164 -0.167
(0.294) (0.251) (0.225) (0.205)
Log Per Capita Correctional Expenditure -0.0437 -0.121 -0.0872 -0.0361
(0.159) (0.1000) (0.0908) (0.0790)
Log Per Capita Roads and Parking Expenditure -0.0561 -0.00188 -0.0225 -0.0456
(0.0895) (0.0810) (0.0762) (0.0726)
Joint test 3.700 2.814 5.081 6.199
p-value 0.960 0.985 0.886 0.798
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses.
All regressions include year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Continuity Checks: Council and Election Variables
Council Size Elected Seats Rest of Council Sitting Members Other Elected Members
Any Woman % Women Any Woman % Women Any Woman % Women
Female Winner 0.436 0.310 0.0164 -0.0118 0.0356 -0.0605 -0.0588 -0.0402
(0.720) (0.744) (0.119) (0.0459) (0.161) (0.0806) (0.173) (0.106)
Bandwidth 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses. All regressions include year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01





Standard errors are clustered at the city level and are in parentheses.
Regression includes year and state fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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